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ABSTRACT 
Broadcast journalism’s foundational role of informing and engaging the 
American public in order to further America’s self-governing democracy is in 
crisis.  Corporate broadcast owners’ efforts to maximize profits and increase 
advertising revenue during traditional network news and related public affairs 
programming have led to the closing of many investigative and correspondent 
television news bureaus and have arguably hastened the devolution of broadcast 
journalism into a depoliticized spectacle filled with political and celebrity, gossip-
driven infotainment.1  Furthermore, as viewers have abdicated their reliance on 
broadcast journalism as their primary source of political knowledge, they have also 
disengaged from professional broadcast journalists’ dispassionate, impartial and 
aspirationally objective method and manner of presentation.2  This Article contends 
that these definitional shifts in viewer engagement, which serve as underlying 
challenges to broadcast journalism’s deliberative role, are the symptoms, rather 
than the root cause of its deliberative peril.  These shifts are instead the net effect of 
long-standing mainstream societal norms and presumptions that led to the 
narrowing in scope and definition of civic engagement. 
Specifically, such mainstream norms presume a disengagement between civic 
knowledge and participation on the one hand, and the various expressive modes 
(and whims) of popular culture, entertainment and discourse on the other.  This 
assumption of a necessary disjuncture between reason and emotions, particularly 
with pleasure, was reflected in traditional news programming formats and 
personified by professional broadcast journalists during the Golden Age of 
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 1. BONNIE M. ANDERSON, NEWSFLASH: JOURNALISM, INFOTAINMENT, AND THE BOTTOM-LINE 
BUSINESS OF BROADCAST NEWS, at x, xi (2004); GEOFFREY BAYM, FROM CRONKITE TO COLBERT: THE 
EVOLUTION OF BROADCAST NEWS 3, 5, 56 (2010). 
 2. BAYM, supra note 1, at 16, 106. 
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ting foundational 
Am widely engaged and participatory citizenry. 
journalism.  This Article posits that these norms were further solidified and 
reinforced by the creation and early interpretation of the bona fide newscast and 
news interview exemptions to the equal time rule, which absent application of any 
of the bona fide news exemptions, required broadcast owners to provide equal 
access time on a particular program to opposing political candidates if access on 
such programs had been granted to any other candidate running for the same 
office.3
In revisiting the equal time rule and bona fide news and newscast exemptions, 
this Article sheds light on how early interpretations of these exemptions helped to 
solidify network news’s hegemony over who could construct, and what would be 
construed as, accepted political news.  More specifically, this Article contends that 
these hegemonic presumptions and their legal reifications, as embodied in early 
interpretations of the bona fide news and newscast exemptions, resulted in a 
political culture and discourse that was aesthetically sterile.  Indeed, for the first 
three decades following their enactment, the bona fide news and newscast 
exemptions were only applied to candidate appearances on network news and 
public affairs programming anchored by professional broadcast journalists like 
Walter Cronkite.  The resulting political discourse was primarily constructed as a 
white and male one, and thus marginalized the concerns of non-whites and non-
males.  Furthermore, such an aesthetically limiting and sterile discourse may have 
impaired the participatory agency of citizens. 
While this Article acknowledges that media consolidation has contributed to the 
hyper-commercialized and sensationalized spectacle that currently predominates 
broadcast news programming, it maintains that a return to the norms of the Golden 
Age that separated news from entertainment, and reason from the pleasurable, is 
not the answer to addressing broadcast journalism’s peril in engaging the public.  
After all, to do so would simply ignore the extent to which political news presented 
in certain entertainment formats (like “The Daily Show”) not only has become 
widely popular, but also has served as a key deliberative tool that attracts and 
engages viewers in a subversive political discourse apart from the mainstream spin.  
Therefore, media policy should proactively provide the political news necessary for 
maintaining self-governance, irrespective of whether such news is provided in a 
traditional news format and/or in an entertaining one.  The pay and compete model 
discussed herein is not only a step in the direction of restoring broadcast 
journalism’s deliberative role, but also a step towards facilita
erican ideals of a 
 3. Equal Time Amendment to Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 86-274, 73 Stat. 557 
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2006)). 
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The revolution will not be televised; You will not be able to plug in,
turn on and cop out;
You will not be able to skip out for a beer during commercials.
Because, the revolution will not be televised.
There will be no highlights on the eleven o’clock news.
The revolution will not be right back after a message.
The revolution will not go better with Coke,
The revolution will not fight the germs that may cause bad breath.4
Television and everyday life . . . are . . . structured, contingent, and mediated by 
power . . . in ways that are highly complex and contradictory.  Power is 
multidimensional and so must emancipatory strategies be . . . .  To ignore power 
relations, not to mention the political economy of both television and everyday life, 
is profoundly to cripple one’s capacity for critical analysis.5
INTRODUCTION
In an online poll conducted by Time Magazine in 2009, comedian Jon Stewart 
was voted as America’s Most Trusted News Anchorman for his performance as a 
“fake” news journalist on his widely popular “fake” news comedy, “The Daily 
Show,” which aired on the cable channel Comedy Central.6  To the surprise of 
many, Stewart beat out veteran and professional broadcast journalists Brian 
Williams, Katie Couric and Charlie Gibson, who anchored nightly news and public 
affairs programming televised on the three major networks, NBC, CBS and ABC, 
respectively.7  Many saw the results of the poll as a telling manifestation of the 
challenges broadcast journalism has faced in serving its foundational and historic 
role of civically attracting and engaging the American public.8  Some contend that 
broadcast journalism’s demise began with corporate consolidation in media 
ownership and crystallized with the commoditization of news as entertainment.9
This commoditization arguably resulted in the descent of network news into 
commercialized infotainment, sensationalized and celebrity reporting and mere 
recitations of political sound bites rather than exhortations of critical substance.  
 4. GIL SCOTT-HERON, “The Revolution Will Not Be Televised,” on THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT 
BE TELEVISED (RCA Music Group 1988). 
 5. PETER DAHLGREN, TELEVISION AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 40 (1995). 
6. See Now that Walter Cronkite Has Passed on, Who is America's Most Trusted Newscaster?,
TIME POLL RESULTS ,http://www.timepolls.com/hppolls/archive/ 
poll_results_417.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2011); see also Jason Linkins, Online Poll:  Jon Stewart Is 
America's Most Trusted Newsman, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 22, 2009), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/07/22/time-magazine-poll-jon-st_n_242933.html. 
 7. Linkins, supra note 6. 
8. See Roderick Spencer, Fake News Is the Real News, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 30, 2009), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/roderick-spencer/fake-news-is-the-real-new_b_305799.html. 
 9. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at x, xi, xvi; BAYM, supra note 1, at 3, 14. 
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Some feel that the primary purpose of producing broadcast journalism has become 
the promotion of consumption rather than civic engagement.10  As a result, some 
journalism and first amendment reformists champion returning to the Golden Age 
of journalism, an age when political news was clearly separated from 
entertainment, and when professional journalists, like anchorman Walter Cronkite, 
civically informed and guided Americans.11
This Article contends, however, that the challenge facing broadcast journalism 
in engaging the American public long precedes the corporate consolidation of the 
industry and is not rooted per se in the intersection of civic news with 
entertainment.  Instead, broadcast journalism’s deliberative peril lies in its 
continued adaptation of long held and erroneous mainstream societal norms, which 
required that reason be separated from emotions and pleasure, and presumed that 
public and civic knowledge and participation be disengaged from popular culture 
and discourse.  This Article revisits the equal time rule and the bona fide newscast 
and news exemptions to show that these presumptive hegemonic norms were 
further solidified and reinforced by media law and policy, namely via the creation 
and early interpretation of these exemptions.12  When triggered, absent application 
of any of the bona fide news exemptions, the equal time rule requires broadcast 
owners to provide equal access time on a particular program to opposing political 
candidates if access on such program had been granted to any other candidate 
running for the same office.13  This Article focuses primarily on the bona fide 
newscast and news interview exemptions of the equal time rule and posits that their 
early interpretations illuminate the law’s solidification of such norms.14  These 
norms dictated that in order to engage deliberatively, rationalism had to rise above 
and contain both commercial and private self-interest—and could in fact do so via 
an ethical code of professionalism.15
Specifically, with the creation of traditional network news programming and 
formats as personified by the televisual images of journalists Edward Murrow and 
Walter Cronkite, such presumptive norms were grafted into the political public 
sphere and had the effect of narrowly defining civic participatory discourse and 
public engagement.16  Indeed, public discourse and the distribution of political 
 10. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at x, xi, xvi; BAYM, supra note 1, at 3, 14. 
 11. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 20. 
12. See infra Part I.C. 
 13. Equal Time Amendment to Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 86-274, 73 Stat. 557 
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2006)). 
 14. There are two additional exemptions from the equal time rule—namely, bona fide news 
documentaries and on-the-spot coverage of a bona fide news event.  Anne Kramer Ricchiuto, The End of 
Time for Equal Time?:  Revealing the Statutory Myth of Fair Election Coverage, 38 IND. L. REV. 267, 
267–68 (2005).  This latter exemption has been interpreted to include coverage of political debates and 
press conferences.  See generally Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
 15. ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY & JOHN NICHOLS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF AMERICAN 
JOURNALISM: THE MEDIA REVOLUTION THAT WILL BEGIN THE WORLD AGAIN 140 (2010). 
 16. BAYM, supra note 1, at 170.  Unless defined otherwise herein, references to “traditional 
news,” “network news,” “network journalism” or “broadcast journalism” refer to traditional newscast 
formats, style and norms developed and provided by the commercial television broadcast networks and 
not to local news programming or to public broadcasting. 
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news largely became the domain of the professionals in the 1940s when the 
broadcast networks (ABC, NBC and CBS) arguably adopted print journalism’s 
professional code of responsible journalism, which required impartiality, 
objectivity and rationalism.17 Professionalism and rationality in turn required 
professionals to bracket and contain all private self-interests or experiences that, if 
left unchecked, undermined the objective political discourse.18  The net result of 
such bracketing was a rational, aesthetically sterile political culture and discourse 
that was construed primarily as white and male.19  Concerns and issues of other 
groups, including those of minorities, were marginalized during what some have 
ironically characterized as the Golden Age of Journalism.20
Broadcast journalists were soon positioned as the gatekeepers of what was 
construed and accepted as political news.21  Through the uniform provision of 
network news programming, the networks imposed a unitary language on, and 
format for, the provision of political news.22  Aesthetically pleasing presentation 
styles and formats were sacrificed in the process.  Indeed, broadcast owners 
positioned network news as the polar opposite to entertainment programming.23  It 
was deemed as fostering the higher and nobler goals of deliberative discourse while 
entertainment programming was devalued as problematic to deliberation in that its 
primary purpose was to appeal to the emotions of viewers as consumers.24  This 
Article posits that early interpretations of the bona fide newscast and news 
interview exemptions helped to solidify network news’ hegemony over who could 
construct, and what would be construed as, political news.25  Indeed, for the first 
three decades following their enactment, the bona fide newscast and news interview 
exemptions were only applied to candidate appearances on network news 
programming and to traditional network news inspired public affairs programming, 
such as “Meet the Press” and “Face the Nation.”26
 17. JACK FULLER, WHAT IS HAPPENING TO NEWS: THE INFORMATION EXPLOSION AND THE 
CRISIS IN JOURNALISM 12–15 (2010).  Unless otherwise defined herein, “political news” as used 
throughout this Article is best defined by Robert McChesney in his recent book: 
[N]ews is what you and I need to keep our freedom—accurate and timely information on [but not 
limited to] laws and wars, police and politicians, taxes and toxics.  Freedom is about a lot more 
than being able to pick your hairstyle or decide what color shirt to wear.  Freedom in the deeper 
civic sense involves controlling one’s life, one’s social environment, one’s future, in 
collaboration with other members of the community . . . . Freedom [also] requires that the 
choices be made in a democratic fashion. 
MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 164 (internal quotations omitted). 
 18. BAYM, supra note 1, at 11; FULLER, supra note 17, at 12–15. 
 19. BAYM, supra note 1, at 49. 
 20. MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 50–51. 
 21. BAYM, supra note 1, at 49. 
22. Id. at 12. 
23. Id. at 11. 
24. Id.
25. See infra Part I.C. 
 26. Michael Damien Holcomb, Comment, Congressional Intent Rebuffed:  The Federal 
Communications Commission’s New Perspective on 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)(2), 34 SW. U. L. REV. 87, 93 
(2004); see also Jonathon D. Janow, Note, Make Time for Equal Time:  Can the Equal Time Rule 
Survive a Jon Stewart Media Landscape?, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1073, 1079 (2008). 
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In applying bona fide news exemptions in this way, this Article contends that the 
Federal Communication Commission (“FCC”) embraced conventional norms 
steeped in modernistic logic, which placed a premium on the reason and rationality 
typified by traditional news formats and personified by professional broadcast 
journalists.27  Indeed, early FCC guidance exempted candidate appearances on 
such network news programming from equal time requirements—arguably because 
of the rationalism and objectivity these shows presumptively embodied given the 
format and the presence of the professional journalist or expert. Candidate 
appearances on most entertainment programs, however, did trigger the equal time 
requirement.28  This legal reification of professionalism and the professional 
journalists also problematically fostered what some have coined as a thin 
citizenship where citizens were stripped of their own agency, and construed as 
needing to receive political cues from such professionals on civic discourse and 
engagement.29  As other media and programming options became available through 
cable, viewers began to “tune out” from broadcast journalism, eventually becoming 
disinclined to follow along paternalistically as the recipients of broadcast 
journalism’s cues.30  They preferred instead to proactively engage as cocreators in 
the dissemination, construction and negotiation of political discourse, as arguably 
evidenced by the widely popular appeal of, and participatory engagement on, 
entertaining day time talk shows, like “Donahue.”31  Interestingly, most legal 
scholarship exploring these bona fide news exemptions laments the FCC’s rulings, 
beginning in the 1980s, which extended the exemptions beyond traditional news 
formats to such entertainment programs, commonly referred to as tabloid 
journalism.32  Such extensions are deemed as primary contributing factors to the 
trivialization and commercialization of the political news necessary for a self-
governing public.33
This Article contends, however, that by initially extending these bona fide news 
exemptions to shows generally classified as entertainment, such as “Donahue,” 
these rulings, in theory, also challenged the long held and erroneous conventions in 
network journalism that bifurcated traditional news formats from entertaining ones.  
With such a new beginning, these rulings shifted the paradigm and had the capacity 
of broadening the topics, the arena and format of deliberation in the public sphere.  
They also drew in participants who might not have otherwise been engaged due to 
 27. The FCC replaced the Federal Radio Commission pursuant to the Communications Act of 
1934 as the administrative body charged with regulating the nation’s telecommunication and 
communication systems.  See Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (1934) 
(current version at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006)); see also infra Part I.C. 
 28. Holcomb, supra note 26, at 88, 100. 
 29. BAYM, supra note 1, at 170. 
30. See generally Holcomb, supra note 26. 
 31. DAHLGREN, supra note 5, at 27; JEFFREY P. JONES, ENTERTAINING POLITICS: SATIRIC 
TELEVISION AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT 149, 158, 181 (2d ed. 2010). 
32. See generally Janow, supra note 26, at 1085. 
33. See generally Holcomb, supra note 26; Henrik Ornebring & Anna Maria Jonsson, Tabloid 
Journalism and the Public Sphere:  A Historical Perspective on Tabloid Journalism, 5 JOURNALISM 
STUD. 283 (2004). 
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lack of interest or to marginalization in the mainstream political discourse.  This 
theoretical development was short lived in practice, however, as massive media 
consolidation made possible by the repeal of limits placed on media ownership and 
other FCC deregulatory efforts blurred traditional news and entertainment 
further.34  Such blurring was not for the purpose of facilitating a wider 
participatory discourse, but rather was aimed to, and had the effect of, 
commoditizing political news as “infotainment” to maximize profits for new 
corporate conglomerate owners.35
Within this conglomerated context and shift in broadcaster vision, the FCC gives 
deference in its current application of the bona fide newscast and news interview 
exemptions to broadcaster judgment.36  But today, in spite of being cloaked in 
normative traditional news formats, broadcasters are focused on retaining viewers 
via sensationalized reports, celebrity coverage and by providing mere sound bites 
rather than “real” political news of substance.37  This Article contends that, 
although the FCC aptly continues to retreat in its interpretation of the bona fide 
newscast and news interview exemption from the presumption that entertainment 
programming on the whole has little, if any, deliberative value, the FCC 
nevertheless continues to preserve presumptions that traditional news programming 
is itself inherently valuable as a deliberative tool.38  Indeed, this Article posits that 
the FCC presumes such programming still engages citizens simply because it is 
information provided pursuant to a claimed journalistic/editorial judgment, and 
within a traditional network news format. 
This Article explores the law’s continued assumption of such news’s 
deliberative value and its failure to acknowledge (or rather, to delineate as it has in 
entertainment programming contexts) that network news, like some music and other 
entertainment content, can also be purely entertaining and may contribute little, if 
any, value in informing and engaging the deliberating public with the political news 
necessary to sustain a self-governing democracy.39  This Article also challenges 
media reformists’ advocacy for return to a regulatory paradigm that will bring back 
traditional news formats, style, and programming typified by the Golden Era.  To 
regain and broaden broadcast journalism’s deliberative legitimacy and function, 
such calls for reform must recognize and yield to the power of television and not 
return to the top down, humdrum, deadpan and sterile format that epitomized the 
Golden Age of Journalism.  To do so would erroneously overlook the extent to 
which political news, when presented in a manner that is both entertaining or 
aesthetically and popularly appealing (for example, on Comedy Central’s 
 34. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 21–22; MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 40. 
 35. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at x, xi, xvi, 7; BAYM, supra note 1, at 5. 
 36. Holcomb, supra note 26, at 94. 
37. See infra Part II.B.1. 
38. Id.
39. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (acknowledging political value of 
politically motivated satire, despite its appearance in a medium of pop culture, namely Hustler
magazine).  See generally Akilah Folami, From Habermas to Get Rich or Die Tryin:  Hip Hop, the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, and the Black Public Sphere, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 235 (2007) 
(discussing value of music, specifically hip hop, to deliberative discourse). 
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“Politically Incorrect” or “The Daily Show”), attains legitimacy as a political news 
source for deliberative purposes. 
Moreover, this Article contends that precisely because Americans are tuning 
into entertaining sitcoms, tabloid talk shows, escapist soap operas, sensational 
reality TV, sound-bite news pundits and satirical and comedic late night talk shows, 
those who value and advocate for a wider, authentic, critical and participatory 
democracy must consider the potential of entertaining and sensational television in 
drawing audiences into the deliberating discourse.  Television continues to grab, 
hold and deliver the much sought after prize, by politician and advertiser alike—the 
attention of the viewing and voting consumer/citizen—in the hyper-mediated, 
information age of the twenty-first century, be it by content provided via broadcast 
or cable/satellite television or via recalibration on the Internet.  Challenges must 
continue to be mounted against the current hyper-commercialized and 
sensationalized spectacle that predominates broadcast and cable news 
programming, and is devoid of political news necessary for sustaining self-
governance.  Calls to revive, rescue and reshape a sustainable journalism that 
investigates, informs and engages the public with the necessary political news must 
still be televised nonetheless—and televised in a manner that capitalizes on 
television’s popular mass and entertaining appeal.  Reform movements must 
account for the media saturated public sphere and the multidimensional and 
intersecting ways in which people are not only informed, but also civically engaged 
and participatory. 
Part I of this Article highlights the early American history of participatory 
infrastructure and the values attached thereto.  Part I also exposes many of the 
contradictions inherent in both the adoption and adaptation of a professional 
journalism code that elevated, for deliberative purposes, network news over most 
content construed as entertaining, and thus fostered what some have termed thin 
citizenship.40  Part II highlights the current trend of politicized entertainment 
programming in enhancing political news and discourse, in contrast to the 
commercialization and deliberative stagnation of mainstream traditional news 
sources.  Finally, Part III is motivated by scholar Cass Sunstein’s work urging first 
amendment media scholars and activists to move beyond the two juxtaposing 
frames—regulatory public interest and laissez-faire market incentive—that have 
driven broadcast regulation and policy since its inception, and to explore open 
ended and creative approaches to remedying the current crisis in broadcast 
journalism’s deliberative function.41
This final section suggests a modest remedy:  the adoption of a slightly modified 
“pay and compete” model that factors in the equal time rule as it relates specifically 
to enhancing the provision of political news via candidate appearances on broadcast 
television.  The pay and compete model would require broadcasters to pay a fee to 
a public entity for continued licensure of the broadcast spectrum, but also would 
grant them the opportunity to compete with other broadcasters to earn back the fee 
 40. BAYM, supra note 1, at 170. 
 41. Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV. 499, 505 (2000). 
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by creating quality content that satisfies predetermined standards.  This model 
blends both traditional regulatory and market based media policies, is less intrusive 
than traditional FCC regulation and resolves some of the market inefficiencies that 
have historically rendered political news vulnerable to underproduction and lacking 
in substance.42
I.  DELIBERATING INFRASTRUCTURE:  FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 
AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
American history reveals the early nation’s firm commitment to the ideals of 
fostering an open, participatory and civically informed citizenry.  Even before 
enactment of the First Amendment’s pronouncement that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,” newspapers were already 
in print and circulation.43  Indeed, “[w]hen the First Amendment was adopted and 
for many years thereafter, anybody with anything to say had comparatively little 
difficulty in getting it published:  presses were cheap; the journeyman printer could 
become a publisher and editor by borrowing the few dollars he needed to set up his 
shop.”44  In addition, although the press operated without the benefit of major first 
amendment protections until the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
marketplace of ideas, both partisan and independent, was overflowing, open and 
accessible.45
An open and accessible free press was generally understood as indispensable 
and necessary to popular sovereignty.46  Thomas Jefferson, in his famous letter to 
Edward Carrington in 1787, emphatically claimed that “were it left to me to decide 
whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without 
a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter.”47  Over 150 
years later, Justice Hugo Black echoed Jefferson’s sentiment in Associated Press v. 
United States, noting that it was the grave concern for sustaining a free press that 
prompted the very adoption of the First Amendment.48  However, because the First 
Amendment’s freedom of the press and freedom of speech provisions are not 
elaborated upon within the Constitution, long standing debates have resulted over 
whether the “freedom of the press” language provides privileges separate from, 
42. Id. at 516–17 (discussing the underproduction of political news, the overproduction of fear 
based content and broadcasters’ imitation of other broadcasters’ programming to attract consumers). 
 43. U.S. CONST., amend. I; LEE C. BOLLINGER, UNINHIBITED, ROBUST, AND WIDE-OPEN: A
FREE PRESS FOR A NEW CENTURY 56 (2010). 
 44. BOLLINGER, supra note 43 (internal citation omitted). 
 45. ROBERT W.T. MARTIN, THE FREE AND OPEN PRESS: THE FOUNDING OF AMERICAN 
DEMOCRATIC PRESS LIBERTY, 1640–1800, at 4–5 (2001); MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 
135 (“Nearly all viewpoints would get a fair hearing in the marketplace . . . and if the existing range of 
viewpoints was insufficient new newspapers could be launched.”). 
 46. MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 118–19. 
 47. ERIC LANE & MICHAEL ORESKES, THE GENIUS OF AMERICA: HOW THE CONSTITUTION 
SAVED OUR COUNTRY AND WHY IT CAN AGAIN 93 (2007) 
 48. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (noting that the First Amendment 
“rests on the assumption that . . . a free press is a condition of a free society”). 
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and/or in addition to, those imparted as “freedom of speech.”49
Historically, some scholars have read the freedom of the press clause as creating 
an institutional press that was granted a unique status with rights “distinct from 
individuals exercising free speech rights, and . . . from other commercial 
enterprises.”50  It is clear, however, that to the extent that specialized rights were 
granted to the press, they were granted to the press in its capacity as a watchdog for 
abuses of power and as an informational tool for the deliberating public who, in 
turn, held leaders accountable through votes.51  Any reading of the First 
Amendment’s freedom of the press provision as protecting an institutional press or 
profession must be grounded then in the premise that such protections are based on 
the institutional press being imbued “with a public purpose, a systemic function as 
vital to American democracy as the three official branches of government . . . . The 
relevant metaphor . . . is that of the Fourth Estate.”52
While not mutually exclusive, an equally strong and legally sound interpretation 
of the First Amendment’s freedom of the press provision is one that regards it as “a 
structural provision of the Constitution.”53  One of its central goals in this paradigm 
is “the creation of a system of deliberative democracy,” intended not only for 
printers and their private gain but also for the fostering of civic knowledge.54
Indeed, such a system of deliberative democracy was envisioned to provide 
participatory protections not only for the institutional press but also for all 
citizens.55  Moreover, it was deemed necessary for the “maintenance of our 
political system and an open society,” and for the “solicitude not only for 
communication itself, but also for the indispensable conditions of meaningful 
 49. BOLLINGER, supra note 43, at 8–9.  The main body of the Constitution itself contained no 
direct reference to freedom of speech or the press.  LANE & ORESKES, supra note 47, at 93.  Rather, the 
Bill of Rights was at least partially a product of the Framers’ need “[t]o win votes for ratification . . . [by 
offering] to support something they had originally thought was unnecessary:  a bill of rights.”  Id.
 50. MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 149. 
51. Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 28–29 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  The press, as well as the 
public, was not, however, always consistently granted full freedom to criticize the government in order 
to hold them accountable.  Within eight years of ratification of the Bill of Rights, the government passed 
“a piece of legislation, a blight on American constitutional history, known as the Sedition Act.”  LANE & 
ORESKES, supra note 47, at 108.  The Act “in effect criminalized criticism of the president and Congress 
. . . [and specifically targeted] the press.”  Id. at 110.  The Act expired before any challenge to its 
constitutionality could be mounted in court.  Id. at 114–115.  Justice Brennan stated later that 
“[a]lthough the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the 
day in the court of history.”  N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964). 
 52. BOLLINGER, supra note 43, at 9; see also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools:  The 
Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 848–49 (arguing that when 
operating as a fully functional Fourth Estate, the press’s role is to illuminate the public and indeed guide 
and inform public discourse). 
 53. Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975). 
 54. Cass R. Sunstein, Statement of Cass R. Sunstein, in CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCASTING 
FUTURE: FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INTEREST OBLIGATIONS OF DIGITAL 
TELEVISION BROADCASTERS 94, 97 (1998), available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/piac/piacreport.pdf [hereinafter ADVISORY COMMITTEE] (emphasis 
added); see also MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 115.   
55. See Sunstein, supra note 41, at 524. 
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communication.”56  American press historian Robert Martin confirms this 
interpretation by establishing that the free press and open press doctrines of the 
First Amendment coexisted in America’s history, with the former referring to the 
institutional press defending the public liberty against abuses of power and the 
latter referring to the individual right of every person to air his or her views for all 
to consider.57
Early government policies reveal a desire to sustain an inclusive participatory 
press infrastructure even at a time when private market interests showed little 
interest in doing so.58  Indeed, government subsidies were instrumental to 
developing an institutional press, which included both independent and highly 
partisan papers published by political parties.59  Such incentives were definitional 
in maintaining the structure of the developing industry, and exemplified 
“enlightened democratic policymaking, because it offered the same benefits to all 
newspapers regardless of their viewpoint.”60  American public policy also favored 
a communication infrastructure that aimed to inform and engage a broader 
participatory public.61  From the outset, “[p]ublic policy . . . focused explicitly on 
getting the news to a wide readership, and chose to support news outlets by taking 
on costs of delivery [via postal subsidies] and, through printers’ exchanges, of 
production [via printing subsidies].”62  Thomas Jefferson, as the nation’s second 
Secretary of State, fully endorsed such government subsides because he saw a press 
free to investigate and criticize the government as essential for a nation practicing 
self-governance.63
Furthermore, to foster a more meaningful engagement of American citizenry, 
Jefferson also advocated for public education and libraries because “for [him], 
 56. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 588 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added); Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967). 
 57. MARTIN, supra note 45, at 4–5. 
 58. MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 128. 
59. Id. at 133.  McChesney and Nichols point out that journalism historians find it difficult to 
reconcile that the “same enlightened geniuses who crafted the First Amendment also created a partisan 
press system subsidized by political parties and government contracts, not to mention postal giveaways.”  
Id. at 129.  Moreover, they stress that the key—then and now—to maintaining a participatory democracy 
with a partisan press system is, however, that “multiple competing well-funded media.”  Id.  Finally, 
they note that media owners, who traditionally and systematically raise laissez-faire market based 
arguments against any government involvement in media, often neglect to mention this particular history 
of government intervention via the favorable economic structural regulations that benefited their 
industry.  Id. at 143.  Some benefits are currently still in place, including those, for example, that 
exclude broadcaster advertising revenue from state sales taxes and allow them to be treated as a 
legitimate deductible business expense from a business’ taxable income.  Id.
60. Id. at 126. 
 61. DAVID M. HENKIN, THE POSTAL AGE: THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN COMMUNICATIONS IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 42 (2006) (noting that the post office was significant in the lives of 
Americans in the eighteenth to the nineteenth century as it was the primary means of mass 
communication). 
 62. MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 126.  In addition, while the developing nation 
borrowed many of its laws and policies from Britain, American policy chose not to replicate its taxation 
on American editors and publishers thereby making it easier for them than for their British counterparts 
to start and maintain papers.  Id. at 132. 
63. Id. at 120–21. 
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having the right to speak without government censorship is a necessary but 
insufficient condition for a free press, and therefore democracy.  It also demands 
that there be a literate public, a viable press system, and that people have easy 
access to this press.”64  As a result, public information and the press were viewed 
as “the light of publicity” which lay at “the heart of democracy” and exposed, via 
political news and public information, those in positions of power who violated the 
public trust.65  To Jeremy Bentham, such publicity was a prerequisite for the 
creation of an enlightened public judgment.66  For John Stuart Mill, the light of 
publicity exposed and subjected government action to the will of the governed.67
Immanuel Kant thought that publicity engaged citizens in public discourse.68
These sentiments regarding the press’s role and function in a deliberating 
democracy are theoretically similar to those of German philosopher Jurgen 
Habermas on his theorized “public sphere.”69  Indeed, with regard to western 
deliberative democratic history, Habermas has acknowledged that the press was the 
primary agent of publicity.70
Habermas’s vision of the public sphere was introduced in his seminal book, 
Structural Transformations of the Public Sphere, where he examined the rise and 
decline in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries of the bourgeois public 
sphere in Europe.71  For Habermas, the bourgeois public sphere (like the press 
infrastructure envisioned by Jefferson and others) was a domain where private 
individuals gathered and disseminated information to educate and cultivate a 
collective public voice positioned to hold those in power accountable.72  The public 
sphere was not premised on a specific physical space per se, but was envisioned 
more as a “domain of social life in which such a thing as public opinion could be 
64. Id. at 119. 
 65. BAYM, supra note 1, at 43–45; see also Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Toward a 
Better Competition Policy for the Media:  The Challenge of Developing Antitrust Policies that Support 
the Media Sector’s Unique Role in Our Democracy, 42 CONN. L. REV. 101, 105 (2009) (“A competitive 
‘marketplace of ideas’ . . . is based on the theory that truth prevails in the widest possible dissemination 
Publicity, Public Use of Reason and Social Control, 24
 Public Opinion:  J.S. Mill on the Public Sphere, 22 
MEDIA
n eds., 2000); see also Splichal, supra note 66, at 14–15. 
rms from the Perspective of Critical Culture Legal 
Public Sphere, reprinted in HABERMAS AND 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE PUBLIC SPHERE 49, 50 (Nick Crossley & John Michael 
of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.”). 
 66. Slavko Splichal, The Principle of 
MEDIA, CULTURE, AND SOC’Y 11–12 (2002). 
 67. Bruce Baum, Freedom, Power and
HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 501 (2001). 
 68. Simone Chambers, A Culture of Publicity, in DELIBERATION, DEMOCRACY, AND THE
193 (Simone Chambers & Anne Costai
 69. BAYM, supra note 1, at 44. 
70. Id.  Habermas, however, would more than likely stop far short of recognizing the press as a 
public sphere in its own right given his allegiance to reasoned debate as the only effective means of 
holding authority accountable.  See Rosemary J. Coombe & Jonathan Cohen, The Law and Late Modern 
Culture:  Reflections on Between Facts and No
Studies, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 1029, 1043 (1999). 
 71. Jurgen Habermas, Further Reflections on the 
THE PUBLIC SPHERE 421, 422 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1999). 
 72. Ken Hirschkop, Justice and Drama:  On Bakhtin as a Complement to Habermas, in AFTER 
HABERMAS: NEW 
Roberts ed., 2004). 
FOLAMI Corrections 6 13 11 6/13/2011 9:41:47 PM 
380 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [34:3 
lt, 
formed.”73  In this theoretically egalitarian space, all had access with participants 
bracketing differences, social inequalities and even private interests for the sake of 
the common good, which was to be determined by consensus of the participants 
and by reasoned, truthful and enlightened debate.74  To Habermas’s dismay, private 
interests undermined those of the common good and cut short the maturation of his 
theorized public sphere and the independence of public opinion.75  As a resu
“public communication . . . [became] moderated by the demands of big bu ins ess 
and . . . led to a regressive ‘dumbing down’ of the level of public debate.”76
Many scholars, enticed by Habermas’s public sphere theory, have found his 
historical reading and interpretation of the bourgeois public sphere problematic due 
to the model’s inherent ideological contradictions.77  They contend that 
Habermas’s bourgeois model was anything but open and accessible to all with 
private interests and inequalities of status bracketed.78  In rereading eighteenth-
century European history, such theorists have revealed that the period’s norms 
excluded women, people of color and unpropertied men from the bourgeois public 
sphere that Habermas idealizes.79  By idealizing the bourgeois public sphere and its 
definition of civic participation, Habermas fails to appreciate the true repressive 
nature of this sphere, and incorrectly situated it as the public—ignoring the 
existence of alternative nonbourgeois public groups and their alternate modes of 
political expression and discourse.80  Scholars have revealed that contemporaneous 
with the “bourgeois public there arose a host of competing counter-publics, 
including nationalist publics, popular peasant publics, elite woman’s publics and 
working class publics,” which emerged as popular movements that resonated with 
the same democratic fervor as the bourgeois public sphere and manifested their 
own distinctive cultures, norms and desires.81
 73. Maria Simone & Jan Fernback, Invisible Hands or Public Spheres?  Theoretical Foundations 
for U.S. Broadcast Policy, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y, 287, 291 (2006). 
 74. Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere:  A Contribution to the Critique of Actually 
Existing Democracy, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE, supra note 71, at 109, 113.  Habermas 
called this process the ideal speech scenario in which participants, who started out with views based on 
their individual experiences and self-interest, experienced a “self-revelation, whereby private needs are 
brought to consciousness and adjudicated through rational dialogue . . . . Ideal speech must bracket off 
potentially distorting material forces and inequities.”  Michael Gardiner, Wild Publics and Grotesque 
Symposiums:  Habermas and Bakhtin on Dialogue, Everyday Life and the Public Sphere, in AFTER 
HABERMAS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE PUBLIC SPHERE, supra note 72, at 28, 35. 
 75. Geoff Eley, Nations, Publics and Political Cultures:  Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth 
Century, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE, supra note 71, at 289, 293. 
 76. John Michael Roberts & Nick Crossley, Introduction to AFTER HABERMAS: NEW 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE PUBLIC SPHERE, supra note 72, at 1, 6 (“[A]s the mass media began to establish 
itself as a viable economic market . . . it was both hijacked for the purpose of selling goods, via 
advertising, and became a considerable saleable commodity in its own right.”). 
77. See generally Fraser, supra note 74, at 109–42; Mary P. Ryan, Gender and Public Access:  
Women’s Politics in Nineteenth-Century America, reprinted in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE,
supra note 71, at 259–88. 
78. See Gardiner, supra note 74, at 29. 
 79. Fraser, supra note 74, at 109, 115–18. 
 80. Ryan, supra note 77, at 259, 284. 
 81. Fraser, supra note 74, at 116. 
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Nancy Fraser, for example, highlights the many ways in which Habermas’s 
bourgeois public sphere and its cultural elitism and hegemony were challenged by 
what she calls “subaltern publics.”82  Such publics were parallel discursive arenas 
where members of subordinate social groups invented and circulated counter-
discourses.83  These counter-discourses formulated oppositional interpretations of 
their identities, interests and needs, which in turn challenged the hegemony of the 
mainstream dominant public sphere.84  For Fraser and others, “[t]o maintain an 
inclusive democracy . . . citizens must enter the public sphere
 variety of 
erspectives, epistemic resources, and social positions.”85
A. CULTURAL HEGEMONY AND PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISM
Echoing the contradictions inherent in Habermas’s idealized bourgeois public 
sphere, mainstream America’s early democratic history, including its early press 
history, reveals a conspicuous exclusion and marginalization of the working and 
lower classes, women, the nonpropertied and those deemed property.86  Moreover, 
the shift to an advertisement supported institutional press and the eventual adoption 
and normalization of the press’s professional journalism code exacerbated 
exclusion and marginalization.87  The private commercial self-interests of 
publishers looking to increase advertising profits and the cultural elitism of the 
growing middle and elite classes decimated the competitive local and regional 
working class newspapers that often offered diverging and participatory discourses 
in print.88  This shift began in the mid to late nineteenth century when the press 
became independently commercially viable and many government subsidies were 
discontinued.89  While its commercial viability was due in part to increased popular 
readership and subs rc iption, it was primarily due, however, to the growth of the 
vertisement industry, which itself was a byproduct of the developing industrial 
82. Id. at 109–42. 
83. Id.
84. Id.
 85. BAYM, supra note 1, at 59 (internal citation omitted); see also Fraser, supra note 74, at 120. 
86. See generally Fraser, supra note 74, at 118–20; Michael Schudson, Was There Ever a Public 
Sphere?  If So, When?  Reflections on the American Case, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE,
supra note 71, at 147–63 (noting the initial civic exclusion and later inclusion of women and Blacks).  
With regard specifically to Blacks in this country, Houston Baker, Jr. points out that given the 
exclusionary practices against Blacks, Blacks were essentially deemed as the property of the bourgeoisie 
class, strategically prevented from acquiring literacy and socially constructed as weak, submissive, 
illiterate and devoid of the very intellect and reason necessary to participate civically.  Houston A. 
Baker, Jr., Critical Memory and the Black Public Sphere (1994), reprinted in THE BLACK PUBLIC 
SPHERE: A PUBLIC CULTURE BOOK 5, 13 (The Black Public Sphere Collective eds., 1995). 
 87. MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 135. 
88. Id. at 138–39. 
 89. DAVID PAUL NORD, COMMUNITIES OF JOURNALISM: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS 
AND THEIR READERS 228 (Robert McChesney & John C. Neorne eds., 2001). 
 90. WILLIAM J. THORN WITH MARY PAT PFEIL, NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION: MARKETING THE 
NEWS 44–45 (1987); see also NORD, supra note 89, at 138. 
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With increased demand for advertising space to market products and with low 
barriers to enter the industry, daily newspaper publishing exploded.91  Similar to 
the rise of secreted commercial interests that undermined Habermas’s theorized 
public sphere and the discourse therein,92 publishers downplayed the overt 
partisanship that marked the earlier era of newspapers (in an effort to appeal to a 
wider subscribing audience) while retaining instead covert associations with 
political parties and factions.93  The views in the marketplace of ideas were 
theoretically plentiful; in practice, however, the de facto effect of newspaper 
reliance on advertisement soon pruned abundant and competitive markets into 
concentrated commercial ones.94  Fewer and larger newspaper monopolies soon 
developed, thereby increasing economic barriers of new newspapers to enter and 
smaller ones to compete “as advertisers rationally flocked to the leading 
newspaper(s) that could offer the best rates and the widest reach.”95  These larger 
newspapers became part of the mainstream public sphere because they had “the 
largest audiences and [were] generally considered most important by members . . . 
of the political, economic and cultural elites.”96  They soon, however, drew the ire 
of their most ardent supporters, as did the publications of the penny press.97
From inception, the penny press, also referred to as yellow journalism or the 
tabloid press, was never deemed respectable journalism by the mainstream public 
press or cultural elites.98  It was disliked due to its open attempts to increase 
readership and advertisement revenue through human interest news, everyday life 
stories and coverage of “scandalous tales of sin, [and] the immoral antics of the 
upper class.”99  A responsible press was expected to provide “reports and 
comments on political happenings, and even more importantly, commercial 
information such as shipping news [because] the audience was the property class, 
not the working class.”100  A rereading of American history reveals that the tabloid 
press served as a subaltern public that “managed to attract new publics, by speaking 
to them about issues previously ignored [by the mainstream press].”101
Nevertheless, it was maligned by cultural elitists “for sensationalism and 
emotionalism, for over-simplification of complex issues, for catering to the lowest 
common denominator and sometimes for outright lies.”102  To the extent larger 
newspapers began to adopt similar sensational reporting styles and stories in an 
effort to increase advertising revenue and subscription base, they too became the 
 91. MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 133. 
 92. Craig Calhoun, Introduction to HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE, supra note 71, at 1, 39–
42; Schudson, supra note 86, at 143, 152. 
 93. MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 133–34. 
94. Id. at 135. 
95. Id.
 96. Ornebring & Jonsson, supra note 33, at 283, 285. 
97. Id. at 287. 
98. Id. at 288. 
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 287 (noting that penny press often covered political happenings of the day). 
102. Id.
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subject of elite and middle class contempt for abdicating public servant 
obligations—at least as such obligations were defined by their culturally elitist 
norms.103
Moreover, these larger newspapers also faced strong criticism from the 
progressive era inspired popular press, which, like yellow journalism, was another 
example of a subaltern public and counter-discourse to the mainstream press.104
Indeed, “[t]oward the end of the century, the voices of Populism cried out against 
the economically powerful few who seemed to be responsible for crushing the 
many.”105  Critics, including famed writer Upton Sinclair, railed against the 
advertisement based press structure whose growing monopolistic nature threatened 
to undermine the ideals of the free and open press advanced by early American 
interpretations of the freedom of the press clause.106  Indeed, certain populist 
movements advocated for alternative press structures such as nonprofit or 
municipally owned models and/or ad-less papers.107  These reform arguments have 
resurfaced today in light of the current concentration of the newspaper industry.108
However, with the “voluntary” adoption of a professional code of journalism in the 
early 1920s—due in part to threats of government regulation to open up access—
the commercial press evaded such growing and pressing populist concerns.109
Publishers skillfully reshaped and narrowed sentiments about freedom of the press 
from concern regarding maintenance of an open and free communication 
infrastructure to consternation rega inrd g government encroachment upon them—
the news gatherers and distributors.110
Even while veiling commercial successes through advertising, they adopted a 
code that on its face addressed the articulated concerns of a growing number of 
culturally (and politically) middle class and elite supporters who rallied against the 
mainstream press’s adoption of elements of tabloid journalism.111  Specifically, the 
publisher supported professional code for reporters and editors advanced the 
“disciplines of accuracy, disinterestedness in reporting, independence from the 
people and organizations reported upon or affected by the report, a mode of 
presentation sometimes called objective or neutral, and the clear labeling of what is 
 103. MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 138. 
104. See generally id. at 139; Fraser, supra note 74, at 109–42 (discussing counter discourses as 
oppositional constructions of identity and interests which challenged the hegemony of mainstream 
HESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 139. 
CRAIG AARON, SAVING THE NEWS: TOWARD A 
IN THE 
SPAPER EDITORS 1923–1993 (1995). 
mate, and permitted them to 
 century.”  Id.
ideologies).
 105. FULLER, supra note 17, at 13. 
 106. MCC
107. Id.
108. See VICTOR PICKARD, JOSH STEARNS &
NATIONAL JOURNALISM STRATEGY 1, 10-11 (2009). 
 109. MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 140; PAUL ALFRED PRATTE, GODS WITH
MACHINE: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEW
 110. MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 140. 
111. Id.  Indeed, “[f]or reporters and editors, professional journalism allowed them some autonomy 
from direct commercial pressures as they went about their work; for publishers, professionalism made 
their increasing market power and dependence upon advertising legiti
generate extraordinary rates of return for a
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atic good and the latter 
fact and what is opinion.”112  The issue was recast from a struggle for an open and 
participatory press infrastructure, to one for maintaining political news’s legitimacy 
itself.113  Political news was instead now determined by respectable (and rationally 
objective) professional journalists rather than by trash sensationalist journalists, an 
encroaching government or even the popular sentiments and desires of the 
public.114  It was a recasting that was itself a reflection of the historical moment in 
which it arose.115  This progressive era sentiment, itself an extension of the 
historical era “generally referred to as modernity . . . was marked by twin forces of 
rationalization and professionalization—the dividing of social life into distinct 
domains and the relianc  oe n professional expertise to identify and solve problems 
within those domains.”116
Benefitting directly then from self imposed adoption of a professional code 
reflecting modernity’s ideals, publishers’ commercial interests were secreted by 
their “high-modern journalists [who] were assumed to be informational 
professionals, value free experts committed to the ideals of an objective public 
interest and the rational pursuit of social order.”117  Pursuant to such code, the 
“distinctive and crowning claim of professional journalism was that a division 
could be established between the owner/advertiser on the one hand and the 
editor/reporter on the other hand.”118  Moreover, the process of becoming a 
professional required an eradication of “petty passions and narrowed ambitions,” 
which were both deemed flaws to reason.119  Similarly, the civically engaged 
participant in Habermas’s idealized public sphere was, like the professional 
journalist, expected to disengage from commercial pressures and bracket private 
self-interests to engage in reasoned debate and argument to objectively assess the 
common good.120  In Habermas’s idealized public sphere, reasoned debate alone 
was the method of communicating sentiments in a deliberating democracy.121
Similarly with professional journalism, rationality, reason and refinement were cast 
as the polar opposite of the emotional (and hence the sensational), with the former 
construed as satisfying the noble, public and democr
 112. FULLER, supra note 17, at 12. 
 113. MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 135. 
ions and 
out history, had produced unutterable horror.”  Id. at 13. 
 at 11. 
EL SCHUDSON,
RY OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS 126 (1978). 
114. Id.
 115. FULLER, supra note 17, at 12–15.  Publishers and their professional code both reflected and 
benefitted from a citizenry coming out of the travesties of the American Civil War who found “the 
values of professionalism and expertise . . . attractive [because] they implied impersonality, respect for 
institutions as effective organizers of enterprise . . . [and the] . . . antidote to the human pass
fighting faiths that recently, as through
 116. BAYM, supra note 1,
117. Id. at 11–12. 
 118. MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 140. 
 119. FULLER, supra note 17, at 14.  Indeed, implicit in the allegiance to reason is a distrust of 
emotions, as made clear by Justice Pound that “[i]n place of reason we have subconscious wishes, 
repressed desires, rooted behavior tendencies, habitual predispositions.”  Roscoe Pound, The Cult of the 
Irrational, WELLESLEY ALUMNAE MAG., Aug. 1929, at 368, quoted in MICHA
DISCOVERING THE NEWS: A SOCIAL HISTO
 120. Gardiner, supra note 74, at 35. 
 121. Habermas, supra note 71, at 423. 
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alization of network news 
an e politicizatio  of entertainm t programming 126
B. BROADCAST OMPROMISES,
tha
satisfying private, selfish and individualistic interests.122
Although the commercial pressures from an advertisement subsidized printing 
press and an exacting professional code continually clashed and eventually 
imploded—as shown by the current economic crisis in print journalism—at the 
time, the adoption of the code veiled publisher private interests and staved off 
government interference in the news business.123  Moreover, presumptive norms 
that developed from such code’s implementation positioned reporters and editors as 
the proper arbiters for determining newsworthiness and standards for political 
news’s distributional style, format and content.124  Arguably, the code also 
assumed that professional and editorial journalistic judgments could be neutrally 
authoritative and without commercial (or political) influence in determining what 
constituted democratically valuable information.125  The assumptions underlying 
these norms all came to the fore with the development and regulation of broadcast, 
the viewing preferences of the entertained, the commerci
d th n en .
’S DELIBERATIVE GOALS: EARLY REGULATORY C
EQUAL TIME AND ACCESS AND BONA FIDE NEWS
While of negligible interest to the government for regulatory purposes in the 
early stages of broadcast development, by the 1920s, radio had massive appeal and 
was in such high demand that the government was summoned by citizens and 
businesses alike to regulate the chaos and cacophony on the air caused by signal 
interference and programming overlap.127  In regulating broadcasting, Secretary of 
Commerce Herbert Hoover declared early on that “[t]he ether is a public medium, 
and its use must be for a public benefit. . . . The dominant element for consideration 
in the radio field is, and always will be, the great body of the listening public.”128
As authorized by the Radio Act of 1912, legislation enacted due to widespread 
public appeals for government intervention, Hoover distributed broadcast radio 
licenses to citizens on a first come first serve basis at a time when spectrum 
availability met demand.129  Without a legal framework for distributing such 
licenses, however, the airwaves became cluttered, resulting in indecipher ble noise a
t threatened the industry’s development as a communication medium.130
 122. Ornebring & Jonsson, supra note 33, at 284. 
 123. MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 44. 
t 12 (elaborating on the developmental principles of the Standard 




, Pub. L. No. 62-264, 37 Stat. 302 (repealed 1927); ADVISORY 
O
  Broadcast Media Mergers and Ensuring 
124. Id.
 125. FULLER, supra note 17, a
Model of Professional Journalism). 
126. See NORD, supra note 89, at 10–11 (discussing a revita
recourse for the journalism industry’s rampant commercialization). 
 127. Akilah N. Folami, Deliberative Democracy on the Air:  Re
Radio’s Subversive Past, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 141, 149–50 (2011). 
 128. Herbert Hoover, Proceedings of the Fourth National Radio C
R commendations for Regulation of Radio, Nov. 9-11, 1925, 1926 DEP’T OF COMM. 7. 
129. See Radio Act of 1912
C MMITTEE, supra note 54, at 18. 
 130. Mike Harrington, Note, A-B-C, See You Real Soon:
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In addition, as diverse groups vied for licensure, free speech rights became 
entangled in the call for better regulation on the use and licensing of the finite 
broadcast frequencies.131  To protect their speech interests, members of the broader 
public, including religious groups, labor activists and educators, rallied for a 
common carrier regime for broadcast licensing.132  Under this regime, 
broadcasters, including existing licensees, would have been required to allow 
anyone to buy airtime on a nondiscriminatory basis.133  In staunch opposition to 
this common carrier model, existing broadcast licensees urged Congress to grant 
them full free speech rights, including complete editorial control over the use of the 
licensed spectrum.134  Such control was deemed necessary to effectuate their 
commercial interests in linking local individual stations to one centralized national 
headquarter, an agenda in direct conflict with congressional goals to maintain local 
access outlets for listeners within the broadcaster’s community.135  In 1923, 
broadcasters developed the National Association of Broadcasters and adopted a 
code a few years later in hopes of self-correcting their chaotic industry and staving 
off government imposed regulation as the newspaper industry did with adoption of 
its own professional code around the same time.136  Such self-imposed regulatory 
efforts were abysmally unsuccessful, as individ alu  and commercial broadcasters 
often continued to collide with each other on air.137
With passage of the Radio Act of 1927, Congress attempted to address the 
confusion on the air, and in doing so, also rejected broadcasters’ efforts to receive 
the degree of first amendment editorial rights granted to the press.138  Such 
rejection was due to the broadcast industry’s readily apparent commercial interests 
in networking local radio stations.139  Arguably, rejection was also due in part to 
the broadcast industry’s failure to embrace and accept public trustee obligations, as 
newspaper owners had done (at least facially), with adoption of a professional 
journalism code that canonized public servant responsibilities in its requirement of 
objective and impartial factual reporting of political news.140  Indeed, although the 
a “Diversity of Voices”, 38 B.C. L. REV. 497, 504 (1997). 




 135. Folami, supra note 127, at 150–51 (discussing early congressional goals in distributing 
broadcast licenses broadly and locally to effectuate diversity on air rather than ceding control over the 
nation’s airwaves in one central licensee). 
136. Id.; ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 54, at 46; MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 
140 (“In an era when concerns about monopoly power were common, the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors was created and as its first act formally adopted a professional code for 
journalism.”). 
 137. Ricchiuto, supra note 14, at 267, 269. 
 138. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, §§ 4, 11, 12, 44 Stat. 1163, 1167; ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra 
note 54, at 19. 
139. See generally Paul Cowling, An Earthy Enigma:  The Role of Localism in the Political, 
Cultural and Economic Dimensions of Media Ownership Regulation, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 
257, 288 (2005). 
140. See also MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 140. 
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1927 Act prohibited the imposition of any common carrier regulations on 
broadcast, it included a requirement that effectively limited broadcasters’ first 
amendment editorial rights.141  Specifically, the Act required broadcasters to 
provide access to, or content on, their licensed airwaves pursuant to the interest, 
convenience and necessity of the public, as determined by the FCC.142  The FCC 
was also given broad discretion to define such obligations as time and 
circumstances required.143  This Article contends that, in contrast to the press that 
“volunteered” and professed to serve the public in a way that sustained political 
discourse—even while veiling commercial and monopolistic private interests of 
publishers—broadcasters were now arguably subject to continued regulatory 
oversight pursuant to the public interest standard for failing to do the same.144  In 
exchange for a license to broadcast for free (an item of considerable commercial 
value due to high public demand), broadcasters agreed to comply with the 
government imposed public interest obligations that required them to act as public 
trustees of broadcast for the benefit of the public.145
The abridgement of broadcaster first amendment rights was also premised on 
scarcity doctrine—the idea that the broadcast spectrum is a scarce resource.146
Because spectrum is scarce, government intervention was deemed necessary not 
only to ensure efficient use of a finite number of frequencies, but also to prevent 
unchecked commercial and monopolistic ventures that threatened to undermine 
America’s deliberative infrastructure.147  Indeed, despite the common carrier 
compromise that would have granted the public direct access to the airwaves, 
Congress included two common carrier-like provisions, namely the right to access 
and the equal time rules, which effectively required broadcasters to fulfill a 
 141. ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 54, at 19. 
Redemption of American Broadcast Television Regulation, 6 MINN.
L
t privileged with licenses 
CASTING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 47, 57 (Charles M. Firestone 
calism to Broadcast Communications, 14 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART
142. Id.
143. Id.  These changes were solidified with the passage of the Communications Act of 1934, ch. 
652, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) (installing effectively 
the seven member FCC and replacing the Federal Radio Commission as the regulatory body).  
Moreover, pursuant to such public interest obligations, the FCC also eventually required broadcasters to 
air children’s educational programming and public affairs programming.  Id. at 28–30.  The FCC also 
interpreted such standards in a manner that prohibited broadcasters from airing obscene content and 
content deemed indecent during certain times of the day.  Anthony E. Varona, Changing Channels and 
Bridging Divides:  The Failure and 
J. . SCI. & TECH. 1, 39–40 (2004). 
144. See also Thomas Blaisdell Smith, Note, Reexamining the Reasonable Access and Equal Time 
Provisions of the Federal Communications Act:  Can These Provisions Stand if the Fairness Doctrine 
Falls?, 74 GEO. L.J. 1491, 1493 (1986) (“[T]he physical limitations of the broadcast spectrum justify 
government supervision of programming content pursuant to the public interest convenience and 
necessity standard to ensure that the public is not denied the views of those no
and that the broadcast audience is expose to a diverse marketplace of ideas.”). 
 145. Tracey Westen, Government Created Scarcity:  Thinking About Broadcast Regulation and the 
First Amendment, in DIGITAL BROAD
& Amy Korzick Garmer eds., 1998). 
146. See Red Lion v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
 147. Kristine Martens, Restoring Lo
& ENT. L. & POL’Y 285, 291–92 (2004). 
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149




ong arm of the law does not prevent 
deliberative role early on in exchange for free licensure.148  Drafted into the 1927 
Act and affirmed in the Communications Act of 1934 at 47 U.S.C. §§ 315(a) and 
312(a)(7), the right of access and equal time rules imposed affirmative obligations 
on broadcasters to provide candidates seeking federal office the right to purchase 
airtime, and to provide equal access to the airwaves for all candidates seeking an 
elective o ffice once one candidate for that same office was granted access.
These two provisions were thought of as helping to invigorate and sustain political 
life by providing citizens access to information about candidates running for 
office.150
Indeed, as an informational obligation on broadcasters, the inclusion of both 
sections manifests congressional acknowledgement of the “political potentialities 
of radio,” and of an intent “to encourage full and unrestricted discussion of political 
issues by legally qualified candidates . . . over radio and [subsequently] 
television.”151  Both sections manifest Congress’ “early recognition of the pressing 
need to provide the public with information regarding the functioning of the 
political process and the qualifications of candidates.”152  Moreover, they were 
enacted early on at the in epc tion of mass media to effectuate a deliberative 
infrastructure that had as its goal enabling the “population to better compare the 
positions and qualifications of alternative candidates, [and to make] . . . more 
informed voting decisions.”153
Sections 315(a) and 312(a)(7) also evidence congressional con
rceived broadcaster threat to the deliberative infrastructure ideals valued in earl
erican press history, given broadcast’s ability to influence the public.15
eed, as expressed in Representative Johnson’s statement in 1926: 
The power of the press will not be comparable to that of broadcasting stations when 
the industry is fully developed . . . . They can mold and crystallize sentiment as no 
agency in the past has been able to do.  If the str
monopoly ownership and make discrimination by such stations illegal, American 
thought and American politics will be largely at the mercy of those who operate these 
stations.155
Therefore, § 315(a) specifically provides that during an election season, when a 
broadcaster permits a “legally qualified candidate for public office to use his 
broadcast station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for 
that office in the use of such broadcasting station.”156 The statute’s legislative 
 148. Smith, supra note 144, at 1491. 
 149. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301–26 (2006); Smith, supra note 144, at 1491–92. 
mith, supra note 144, at 1504 (discussing the writings of James Madison, author of the Bill 
f 1927, ch. 169, § 18, 44 Stat. 1162, 1170 (1927) (codified as amended at 47 
 150. Smith, supra note 144, at 1498. 
 151. S. REP. NO. 86-562, at 3 (1956); Smith, supra note 144, at 1497 (internal citation omitted). 
 152. S
of Rights). 
153. Id. at 1509. 
 154. 47 U.S.C. §§ 312, 315. 
 155. 67 CONG. REC. 5558 (1926). 
 156. Radio Act o
U.S.C. § 315 (2006)). 
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r industry.163
Indeed, it readily became apparent through the mass medium of television that such 
divisions came at the expense of fostering a more inclusive and participatory 
history makes clear that its purpose is to “require a broadcaster to treat equally all 
candidates for a particular office . . . once the broadcaster has made its facilities 
available to any one candidate.”157  Moreover, to ensure evenhandedness of 
candidate access and exposure on mass media, candidate “uses” that triggered equal 
time requirements were defined broadly to include “any positive appearance of a 
candidate by voice or picture.”158  With the 1959 Amendment to the equal time 
rule exempting bona fide news appearances, it became clear that the use 
requirement was not intended to include appearances on network news 
programming.159  On the other hand, candidate appearances on entertainment 
programming like children’s shows, comedy shows and rebroadcasts of movies 
featuring candidates did trigger, perhaps appropriately, equal time requirements.160
Such shows were not seen as satisfying the factors for applying the bona fide news 
exemptions, which required that the how s be regularly scheduled, that the 
broadcaster control the program, and that the broadcaster’s decisions on format, 
content and participants be based on newsworthiness and not on an intention to 
favor or harm an individual’s candidacy.161
As this Article asserts, however, these bona fide news exemptions and their 
early interpretations and application reified existing network norms that positioned 
the industry created broadcast journalist as gatekeeper of political news.  Such 
norms relegated political news to network news programming and bifurcated it 
from entertainment programming—a separation that sought to juxtapose reason and 
pleasure, with the former valued and the latter not, for deliberative purposes.162
Moreover, this split between the unprofitable, but civic network news, from the 
profit based entertaining fare essentially replicated the bifurcation in the 1920s of 
the press’s professional journalism ethic from the publisher’s commercial motives 
to increase advertising revenues that were underlying the newspape
 157. Holcomb, supra note 26, at 88 (citing Paulsen v. FCC, 491 F.2d 887, 889 (9th Cir. 1974)). 
ing Policies, 9 FCC Rcd. 651, 
5
presidential candidate Ronald Reagan would constitute a use); Walt 
2) (finding candidate appearance on Disney’s children show, 
hat “[i]n so doing so, it reinforced modernity’s distinctions 
 note 1, at 6 (discussing that initially broadcasters accepted 
158. Id. at 87; Codification of the Commission’s Political Programm
6 1 (1994). 
 159. Smith, supra note 144, at 1498 (citing Paulsen, 491 F.2d 887). 
160. Paulsen, 491 F.2d at 890 (finding equal time requirements triggered even by candidate’s 
appearance on entertainment programming); Adrien Weiss, 58 F.C.C.2d 342 (1976) (finding a 
broadcasting of movies featuring 
Disney Prods., Inc., 33 F.C.C.2d 297 (197
“The Mouse Factory” was a use). 
 161. Janow, supra note 26, at 1080. 
 162. BAYM, supra note 1, at 11, 40 (discussing how the network news format “sacrificed aesthetic 
appeal in favor of indexical realism,” and t
between the political normative and the aesthetic-expressive:  between news and entertainment, and 
ultimately between politics and pleasure”). 
163. Id. at 11 (discussing the perception of network news as being for the primary purpose of 
providing information to the public even if not profitable and divorced from the larger networks “profit 
seeking strategies”); see ANDERSON, supra
that the provision of news was unprofitable and often over budget in its production, but provided news 
pursuant to their watchdog commitments). 
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c
169
itizenry in the mainstream political public sphere and discourse.164
C. CREATING “NEWS,” AND THIN CITIZENSHIP: “MEET THE PRESS” AS BONA
FIDE NEWS
In 1959, the FCC held in the Lar Daly decision that an incumbent’s brief 
appearances in a number of network news clips during election season—including 
one showing him greeting a foreign president and another where he solicited 
contributions for the March of Dimes—constituted a “use” that triggered equal time 
requirements.165  Congress moved swiftly that year to amend the equal time rule to 
override such literal interpretation of the rule’s use requirement.166  The 1959 
amendments exempted bona fide news documentaries, on the spot news coverage 
of bona fide news events, bona fide newscasts and bona fide news interviews.167
The purpose of the amendments was, among other things, to “restore the 
understanding of the law that had prevailed previously.”168  This understanding 
related specifically to the presumed deliberative value of network news. The 
legislative history also illuminates the drafters’ concerns that these exemptions 
might “offer a temptation as well as an opportunity for a broadcaster to push his 
favorite ca din date and to exclude others.”   These exemptions arguably 
resurrected the concerns regarding broadcast’s potential influence on the political 
process which were at the heart of the equal time rule’s initial inclusion in the 1927 
Radio Act.170
Additionally, the legislative history makes clear that Congress deemed such risk 
to be outweighed by appearances “presented at the initiative of the station as part of 
a routine news broadcast in the exercise of the station’s judgment as to newsworthy 
events,” because “[no] one will question that the categories of programs 
exempted . . . serve to enlighten the public.”171  While appearances on 
entertainment programming were presumed inherently suspect as an unsavory 
molder or crystallizer of public democratic sentiment, most, if not all, candidate 
appearances on the same broadcast owner’s network news were accepted as 
political news and in turn bona fide news.172  The implication then was that the 
appearances (and all content for that matter) that appeared thereupon were 
164. Id. at 12 (providing that professional journalism norms “reduced the role of the citizens, 
speaking at and for them but allowing them no role in the conversation except as the audience”). 
 165. CBS, Inc. (Lar Daly), 18 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 238, reconsideration denied, 26 F.C.C. 715 
(1959). 
 166. Smith, supra note 144, at 1498. 
 167. Equal Time Amendment to Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 86-274, 73 Stat. 557 
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2006)). 
 168. Branch v. FCC, 824 F.2d 37, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (emphasis added). 
 169. S. REP. NO. 86-562, at 14 (1959). 
170. Id.
171. Id. at 5, 10. 
172. See Paulsen v. FCC, 491 F.2d 887, 890 (9th Cir. 1974); Holcomb, supra note 26, at 103 (“The 
FCC . . . acknowledg[ed] that the Congressional intent of the 1959 amendments was to give broadcasters 
a ‘greater degree of editorial discretion.’” (citing S. REP. NO. 86-562, at 12 (1959)). 
FOLAMI Corrections 6 13 11 6/13/2011 9:41:47 PM 
2011] FREEING THE PRESS FROM DISCRETION AND HEGEMONY IN NEWS 391 
176
 and as a result, presumably 
informed the public.180  Indeed, network news and such related public affairs 
presumed then to be newsworthy, trustworthy, political and of inherent civic and 
democratic value to the viewing public  In.  addition, television reporters and editors 
were also presumed to be worthy of viewer trust, objectively separated in principle 
from political favoritism and the private commercial interests of their broadcast 
owners, and even disentangled from the slavish self-interested consumption 
oriented desires of the viewing public.173
For example, although the FCC was given exceptional deference in equal time 
claims, Congress made clear with the 1959 amendments (which effectively 
reversed the FCC’s Lar Daly decision) that it sanctioned candidate appearances on 
network journalism—a televisual adaptation of the professional journalism code of 
the mainstream commercial press.174  Specifically, with the creation of the first 
news program on CBS in 1948, broadcast owners dug television out of the 
perception as a commercialized threat to democracy and ironically erected it 
instead, via network news divisions, as the arbiter of all that is newsworthy and 
hence political.175  Through the personification of the printing press’s professional 
code of journalism and the visual image of anchormen like Edward Murrow and 
Walter Cronkite, television was finally welcomed as an arm of the metaphorical 
Fourth Estate, and soon came to define it.   The networks’ uniform construction 
of political news was sustained not only by a regulatory framework that readily 
accepted it as satisfaction of federally imposed public interest obligations, but also 
by a legal elevation of it in deliberative stature as satisfaction of the bona fide news 
cast and news interview exemptions.177
For nearly three decades following the enactment of these exemptions, they 
were only applied to network news programming and to traditional news inspired 
public affairs programs like “Meet the Press” and “Face the Nation,” where 
professional and political commentators often interviewed political candidates.178
Although Congress did not specifically define exempted bona fide news programs, 
it did provide “Meet the Press” and similar public affairs programming as 
examples.179  Such shows characteristically had professionals and experts, who 
interviewed politicians on selected topics of interest,
 173. BAYM, supra note 1, at 11. 
174. See Holcomb, supra note 26, at 91–92.  The exemptions were generally granted with such 
appearances, absent that is, clear evidence indicating a lack of good faith on the part of the broadcaster.  
, 158, 182. 
 note 31, at 158. 
ocal television news, 
equirement was easily met by broadcasting the nightly network news. 
ivic value of such information to the 
Smith, supra note 144, at 1498. 
 175. DAHLGREN, supra note 5, at 48, 62; JONES, supra note 31, at 149
 176. BAYM, supra note 1, at 9, 10, 30; JONES, supra
177. BAYM, supra note 1, at 11.  As Baym writes: 
[F]ederal regulation was built on the principle of trusteeship . . . the insistence that in order to 
profit from the use of the public airwaves, broadcasters were obliged to act as trustees of the air 
and serve the ‘public interest, convenience, and necessity’ . . . . [F]or many l
that r
Id.
 178. Holcomb, supra note 26, at 93. 
 179. 105 CONG. REC. 17,779 (1959); Holcomb, supra note 26, at 93. 
 180. S. REP. NO. 86-562, at 14 (1959) (indicating that the c
public when provided as part of a news broadcast was a given). 
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 role in shaping and processing 
political news and po tions attached to the 
Golden Age began to roadcast journalism 
no
mediated one, and that television and its content must be understood as a 
programs were presumed to provide the reasoned information necessary for a 
healthy democratic culture, including information gleaned by journalists from 
candidate appearances on network news programs.181
However, this construction of political news and, by extension, bona fide news 
also perpetuated what some scholars have defined as a thin citizenship that limited 
and defined who could participate, and how one could participate, in the political 
public sphere and discourse.182  Indeed, such norms “offered no role for the public 
to play save that of passive audience, whose requirements for citizenship could be 
fulfilled simply by watching TV.  High modern news thus encouraged a kind of 
thin citizenship, one . . . that confirmed the public’s psychological incompetence to 
participate in the culture of democratic publicity.”183  As a result, public discourse 
and the attainment and distribution of political news largely became the domain of 
the professionals.  Professionalism and rationality required a self-bracketing (or the 
appearance of self-bracketing) of all private interests or experiences that, if left 
unchecked, undermined the objective political discourse.184  The net result after 
such bracketing was a rational, democratic and political culture and discourse that 
was construed as primarily white and male, a point also made by those critiquing 
Habermas’s idealized public sphere and its “deliberating peers.”185  Concerns and 
issues of those that did not fit such characteristics, including those of minorities, 
were marginalized during what some have ironically characterized as the Golden 
Age of Journalism.186  If not captured by the gatekeepers, the expressivity of such 
marginalized groups, be it in social protests or other activities, was presumed to be 
irrational, civically unruly and, indeed, antidemocratic.187  With the advent of cable 
and the public demand for more of a participatory
litical discourse, the norms and assump
 buckle, thereby foreshadowing the crisis b
w faces in deliberatively engaging the public. 
II.  EXPOSING THIN CITIZENSHIP 
With less face to face exchange and with the increase of media based 
negotiation, public sphere theorists now contend that the public sphere is a 
 181. BAYM, supra note 1, at 168 (noting that high-modern journalism was assumed to be providing 
the citizen with factual information and reasoned interpretation of the political process); see also
Sunstein, supra note 41, at 510 (contrasting traditional network news with the current culture, where 
there is “too little coverage of serious questions, especially during political campaigns,” and noting that 
“[t]he relevant coverage may involve sensationalism and ‘sound bites,’ or attention to who is ahead 
ks what and why”). 
M, supra note 1, at 170. 
of an objective public interest and the rational pursuit of social 
CCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 50–51, 
(‘horse-race issues’) rather than who thin
 182. BAY
183. Id.
184. Id. at 11 (“[H]igh modern journalists were assumed to be informational professionals, value-
free experts committed to the ideals 
order.”); JONES, supra note 31, at 44. 
 185. Fraser, supra note 74, at 115–17. 
 186. BAYM, supra note 1, at 49; M
 187. BAYM, supra note 1, at 49. 
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blic sphere 
in m media fo .  Network ne ified th rg is po ublic sphere, 
an
sociocultural invention shaped by the political culture in which it exists.188  For 
well over four decades, until the mid-1980s, the big three networks (ABC, NBC 
and CBS) dominated and defined television and broadcast journalism.189  Through 
the uniform provision of network news programming, the networks imposed a 
unitary language of political news as defined by their broadcast journalists and, in 
doing so, reinforced a psychological dependence in the viewer citizen on such 
journalists for public and participatory cues regarding political importance and the 
need for civic attention and engagement.190  There was little space or relevance in 
the political discourse for entertainment, or for the whims and pleasures of the 
entertained—the viewing public.  The networks then, like the newspaper 
monopolies that arose out of an advertisement supported press system in early 
American press history, seemed to become the mainstream political pu
ass rm ws typ e bou eo litical p
d was likewise infused with culturally exclusionary and elitist norms. 
A. DAYTIME TALK SHOWS AS SUBALTERN PUBLIC SPHERE: “DONAHUE” AS 
BONA FIDE NEWS
Broadcast’s hegemony over political news, political discourse and the viewing 
public began to unravel in the mid-1980s with cable’s introduction of alternate 
entertainment programming; subscribers were now no longer confined to network 
news during prime time evening hours.191  This shift signaled the beginning of the 
end of network news’s presumptive norms regarding broadcast journalists’ elevated 
status as gatekeepers of political news and discourse, of the bifurcation of political 
news on network formats rather than entertaining ones and of the perpetuation of a 
democratic culture that narrowly defined civic engagement of the viewing public as 
passive followers.192  As viewers began to exercise their own agency and to choose 
 188. DAHLGREN, supra note 5, at 40. 
 189. Sunstein, supra note 41, at 527 (noting that for over three decades television programming 
was provided by the three large networks and later public broadcasting). 
 190. BAYM, supra note 1, at 12 (discussing how the networks’ presentation of the news during the 
network age “imposed . . . a ‘unitary language’ . . . a singular worldview that limited the range of 
understandings about the nature of the political domain and the ways in which it could be represented.  
Reproduced each day, this worldview was taken as the self-evident expression of common sense.”); 
JONES, supra note 31, at 43; James W. Carey, The Press, Public Opinion, and Public Discourse, in
PUBLIC OPINION AND THE  COMMUNICATION OF CONSENT 390–91 (Theodore L. Glasser & Charles T. 
Salmon eds., 1995) (arguing that modernity’s social construction of political discourse confirmed the 
public’s perceived “psychological incompetence” to deliberatively engage in democratic culture). 
191. BAYM, supra note 1, at 15 (noting that with the advent of cable, media networks “lost the 
tight control they used to have over where and when viewers watched particular programs”). 
 192. JONES, supra note 31, at 6.   The networks: 
maintained an artificial separation between politics and popular culture, specifically assigning 
public affairs programming to news divisions while entertainment . . . was managed by different 
divisions . . . . Through forced segregation . . . network executives construed politics in reductive 
terms, primarily handled by experts, employing a grave and serious tone . . . . This separation 
began to be erased, however with the advent of competition from cable and its challenge to the 
network oligopoly in the post-network era. 
Id.
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from a motley of viewing options made possible by the advent of cable 
programming that included twenty-four hour cable news and political pundit talk 
shows, broadcast journalism was no longer perceived as the sole authority on 
political news.193
Moreover, cable’s introduction and increase of entertainment programming 
made unsustainable broadcaster insistence on relegating political news to a format 
deliberately devoid of aesthetic or popular appeal and on premising continued 
network news viewership on a thinly defined notion of a paternalistic 
citizenship.194  Many television viewers began to turn from network news to 
cable’s entertainment offerings, perhaps exhibiting not only a preference for 
entertainment over televised news programming, but also a disconnect from, and 
distaste for, the imposed unitary language and presumptions underlying the 
provision and production of network news and, indeed, democratic culture itself.195
They continued to turn to television for pure pleasure and escapism, and soon also 
for help in processing their everyday life experiences, which necessarily often 
included discursive exchanges about politics and political news.196  In doing so, 
viewers challenged network news’s and broadcast journalists’ top down notions of 
citizen engagement and political relevance.  Television steadily evolved into a 
medium through which human experiences and cultures were both fostered and 
 193. BAYM, supra note 1, at 13, 16 (discussing characterization of more than half of American 
public as “news gazers” receiving information from a motley of sources at no particular set time of day). 
194. See JONES, supra note 31, at 210 (“Citizenship is more than membership in a society.  It is a 
component of our identity . . . a cultural phenomenon that is conceived, negotiated, assembled, fought 
over . . . through our everyday interactions within that society.  The segregation of citizenship from 
consumption, public from private, rationality from emotion . . . is no longer tenable.”).  The network era 
and
ng entertainment choices, . . . such an approach to news . . . [was] . . . increasingly 
ning while appeals to emotions can be key to 
ed calls for taking 
, and it too include[d] drama and humor, seriousness and entertainment, importance and 
modernity required a distinction between: 
news and entertainment, and ultimately between politics and pleasure.  It offered its viewers little 
incentive to tune in beyond its . . . commitment to serving the needs of citizens.  As such, it 
depended on its appeal to the audience’s sense of duty, the obligation of citizenship.  In the face 
of burgeoni
untenable.
BAYM, supra note 1, at 40.  Indeed, in his recent book, former journalist Jack Fuller discusses the role of 
emotions in aiding the brain in processing information.  FULLER, supra note 17, at 64, 175.  For Fuller, 
the lack of emotions could actually lead to poor reaso
helping one process and be attracted to information.  Id.
 195. BAYM, supra note 1, at 169; see also DAHLGREN, supra note 5, at 41; JONES, supra note 31, 
at 21–25 (discussing that while traditional measures of civic engagement, such as voting, voluntarily 
assisting in campaigning and following political knowledge declined considerably until the 2006 and 
2008 campaigns, citizen’s engagement became “textual” and participatory rather than formally 
organizational in that the public clamored, often via negotiations in the media, to define their own social, 
community and public identities).  Indeed, such shift was also due to the shift in political and popular 
cultural sentiments towards politics, politicians, political talk and, in turn, network news as exemplified 
by the election of former actor Ronald Reagan, whose presidential campaign includ
back big government from the politicians and their bureaucratic posturing.  Id. at 48. 
 196. DAHLGREN, supra note 5, at 21; JONES, supra note 31, at 221–22 (providing that politics 
came to be viewed as something that is not attended to separately and “cordoned off from the rest of 
one’s identity, activities or existence in the world.  Politics . . . [became] . . . one of many facets of a 
person’s life
triviality”). 
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stifled.197  It increasingly became a way of aiding public understanding of the 
everyday, the mundan  te, he entertaining and indeed, the political:  it was the 
medium through which the everyday was negotiated from a variety of points, 
including the rational and the pleasurable, and a sometimes simultaneous 
comingling of the two.198
The popular mass appeal of daytime talk shows, like “Donahue,” manifested 
such desired negotiations.199  While “Donahue” and other such talk shows were 
created ironically as a part of broadcasters’ efforts to capitalize on growing popular 
sentiments to be involved in political discourses, viewers participated in setting and 
shaping political agendas through the studio audience and call in portions of the 
shows.200  Indeed, with former professional broadcast journalists as talk show hosts 
on entertainment programming, ordinary citizens brought to the fore issues of 
relevance to their everyday lives.201  They also widened the mainstream political 
discourse by discussing political news and engaging politicians and candidates 
directly when they appeared on such shows—a discursive exchange once reserved 
only for broadcast journalists and political correspondents.202  In response, 
mainstream broadcast journalists disapproved of such comingling of politics on 
entertaining formats, as their print counterparts did with yellow journalism decades 
earlier, and maintained their allegiance to reason, decorum and objectivity, even in 
the face of decreas gin  viewership and civic engagement.   Viewers and their 
viewing choices were dismissed as apathetic, self-interested and enslaved to their 
prurient interests, which threatened the conceived purity and rationality of 
democratic culture.204
With the first Donahue decision, the FCC, under the leadership of Republican 
Anne Jones, implicitly seemed unwilling to acknowledge the participatory 
potentiality of talk shows like “Donahue,” arguably falling back instead on 
conventional network news norms of professionalism and the rational.205  Indeed, 
although the FCC found that there was no evidence of any bad faith to provide 
political advantage to any political candidate over another with respect to the 
appearance, in its first Donahue decision, the agency denied Multimedia’s original 
 197. DAHLGREN, supra note 5, at 40. 
198. Id.  Some scholars, however, in advocating for retrenchment from the market based approach 
to broadcast regulation and for reform of media and public affairs programming, fail to acknowledge the 
duality of the viewing consumer/citizen.  See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 41, at 514.  Politicized 
entertainment and viewer engagement with such programs reveal, however, that the interests of the 
viewing public can be peeked simultaneously in his or her capacity as both consumer and citizen.  
JONES, supra note 31, at 222 (referencing the extent to which cable show “Politically Incorrect” 
simultaneously mingled politics and entertainment and, as a result, served as “a spark for drawing 
viewers toward greater discursive participation in politics—one that includes their ritualized habits and 
 62–63. 
ES, supra note 31, at 6. 
edia Program Prod., Inc. (Donahue I), 80 F.C.C.2d 217, 220 (1980). 
lives as cultural beings and citizens”). 




 203. BAYM, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
204. See generally JONES, supra note 31, at 25. 
 205. Multim
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request for a bona fide news interview exemption.206  The FCC took issue with the 
format because live studio “audience participation . . . takes the ‘Donahue’ format 
even further from the type of interview program contemplated by Congress in light 
of the regular participation by the studio audience and their ability to express 
personal views.”207  Specifically, the Commission found problematic the studio 
audience’s ability “to make statements and/or ask questions of the [political 
candidates] . . . . Indeed, by allowing members of the audience to make statements, 
the ‘Donahue’ program create[d] the very risks that Congress wanted to avoid—
namely, a situation where a program could be used to advance the election of a 
particular candidate.”208  Not only did the F CC  find extrapolating the unfiltered, 
nonbracketed opinions of the nonprofessional, studio audience problematic, but it 
also determined that the majority of the show’s selected topics did not fit within 
traditional understandings of bona fide news.209
Upon reconsideration four years later, the FCC reversed its original Donahue
decision.210  In doing so, credence was given to Multimedia’s argument in the first 
decision “that an evolution of innovative approaches to broadcast news 
programming not available when Congress enacted the news exemptions in 1959” 
should not preclude application of the exemption.211  In addition, still perhaps 
evidencing reluctance to totally unleash discourse to a nonprofessional studio 
audience, in Donahue II, the FCC noted “Mr. Donahue’s ability as a skilled 
professional journalist to maintain absolute control over all aspects of the unique 
‘Donahue’ format,” and “to enhance the newsworthiness of individual 
interviews.”212  The Commission observed reassuringly that “Mr. Donahue cuts off 
any questioner who fails to comply with these procedures, and he relates questions 
posed by the audience in an attempt to focus upon what the licensee had 
determined was the appropriate journalistic approach to a particular topic.”213  It 
concluded that a failure to recognize “Donahue” as a bona fide news interview 
program would send the message to broadcasters that in order to qualify for a bona 
fide news interview exemption, programs “should adhere only to the format of 
certain programs mentioned by Congress over twenty-five years ago.”214
206. Id.
207. Id. at 222. 
 208. Multimedia Program Prod., Inc., 84 F.C.C.2d 738, 744 (1981); see also Multimedia Entm’t, 
 news events.”  Id. at *11 n.10.  See
 201, 222 (1969). 
I, 1984 F.C.C. Lexis 2665. 
7. 
tive 
Inc. (Donahue II), 1984 F.C.C. Lexis 2665, at *7 (1984). 
209. Donahue II, 1984 F.C.C. Lexis 2665, at *11–12.  The show’s topic lists for a three month 
period included shows that were deemed purely entertainment oriented, which related to, among other 
things, human interest stories like “The Super Mom Myth.”  Id.  After its review of the list, the FCC 
concluded:  “[i]n total, it appears that 68% of the episodes reviewed are clearly not ‘news-type 
programs’ as envisioned by Congress, and do not deal with current
also Cmty. Antenna Television Sys., 20 F.C.C.2d
210. Donahue I
211. Id. at *2. 
212. Id. at *1, *
213. Id. at *5. 
214. Id. at *9.  The FCC stressed that Congress not only referenced network news and related 
public affairs programs like “Meet the Press” and “Face the Nation” in the legislative history of the 1959 
amendment as examples of bona fide news interview programs, but also referenced an innova
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less of its subject matter, the type of person interviewed or whether the 
Finally, to further effectuate congressional stated goals to “enable what probably 
has become the most important medium of political information to give the news 
concerning political races to the greatest number of citizens, and to make it possible 
to cover the political news to the fullest degree,” the FCC made clear that not only 
was the format immaterial, but that so also were the segments of the “Donahue” 
show that did not pertain “directly to the political arena, or even to current news 
events.”215  If a show provided regularly scheduled news interviews with political 
candidates, the FCC found that the show could be entitled to an exemption from the 
equal time rule even if it was not specifically a regularly scheduled network news 
or related public affairs program.216  Although the FCC reiterated that deference as 
to newsworthiness of a candidate’s appearance was to be given to the broadcaster, 
the FCC, within the same year, published a Political Primer on Political 
Broadcasting.217  While Donahue II expanded the bona fide news interview 
exemption beyond its traditional ap icatpl ion to network news and similar public 
affairs programming, the FCC, through its Political Primer, emphasized the 
importance of political news remaining substantive and newsworthy, irrespective of 
the format in wh
Indeed, the Primer added two additional factors to the other four to b
nsidered when determining whether a program qualified for the exemption
der § 315(a): 
(a) does the interview take place on a bona fide news program?  If so, the interview is 
exempt regard
news program always contains interviews . . . (b) [i]f the interview does not take place 
on a bona fide news program, does it take place on a bona fide news interview 
program?219
More importantly, it specifically stated that “[m]any ‘interview’ and ‘talk’ 
programs do not qualify as news interview programs.”220  Finally, in referencing 
“bona fide news programs” in the Political Primer as an automatic application of 
the exemption, the FCC seemed to defer again to network news programming, 
which up until that time provided political news pursuant to—and in broadcaster 
acknowledgement of—broadcast journalists’ assumed watchdog and deliberative 
obligations.221  FCC interpretations of the bona fide newscast and n we s interview 
exemptions, however, soon contradicted both the congressional intent underlying 
the enactment of the equal time rule and the import placed on sustaining political 
news and its newsworthiness in Donahue II and the Political Primer.222
While the Donahue II decision theoretically unraveled network news’s 
program at the time called “Youth Wants To Know” that involved questions posed by students. Id.
215. Id. at *15; 105 CONG. REC. 14451 (1959) (emphasis added). 
216. Donahue II, 1984 F.C.C. Lexis 2665 at *13. 
 217. Political Primer, 100 F.C.C.2d 1476 (1984). 
218. See id.
219. Id. at 1496 (emphasis added) 
220. Id.
 221. Holcomb, supra note 26, at 100. 
222. See Janow, supra note 26, at 1085. 
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e FCC’s subsequent bona fide news cast and news interview 
exemptions refocuse  show format and were underscored by deference to a 
broadcast journalis ndone by market 
policies and resulting consolidation in 
In one such deregulatory effort, the FCC, beginning in the mid to late 1980s, 
ational an cal caps on the mber of road
deliberatively limiting modernist conventions, its full potential in drawing in wider 
audiences into the political discourse was cut short.  It was undermined by 
subsequent FCC deregulatory efforts and by deference to broadcast editorial 
judgment that aimed to expand network news viewership to increase profits by 
selling viewers as a commodity to advertisers rather than to facilitate a more 
informed, inclusive and participatory public sphere.223  Indeed, inquiries relating to 
newsworthiness in th
d on
m standard that was arguably slowly u
pressures escalated by FCC deregulatory 
media ownership.224
B. DEREGULATION AND CONSOLIDATION
1.  Professional Journalism as Spectacle 
While the public sphere and political discourse had theoretically been widened 
by Donahue II’s recognition of alternate public discourse spaces (including 
entertainment formats), this Article posits that the potential of such rulings was 
stunted by the FCC’s gradual and dramatic shift in its interpretation to broadcaster 
public interest obligations as primarily market determinative.225  President 
Reagan’s newly appointed FCC Commissioner, Mark Fowler, was the first FCC 
Commissioner in the history of the FCC to advocate for the abandonment of the 
public trustee interpretive standard of the public interest obligation in favor of a 
market based approach.226  Pursuant to the market approach, the FCC gradually 
moved—and still continues to move—toward complete deregulation of 
broadcast.227  It has repealed many public interest regulations adopted to li itm  
concentrated control over the nation’s airwaves at the expense of local and diverse 
public viewpoints.228  Left by the wayside was the view that broadcasters were to 
act as public trustees of the airwaves.  Instead, the public interest standard was now 
set by market determinants which turned on profit maximization and efficiency.229
adopted laws lifting the n d lo  nu b cast stations 
223. See generally C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS, 25–87 (1994);  
see also Sunstein, supra note 41, at 515 (noting that broadcasters provide content to retain a certain 
advertiser desired demographic and to please such advertisers who “want programming that will put 
viewers in a receptive purchasing mood, and hence not be too depressing,” and that “[a]dvertisers also 
r that is too serious, and hence avoid 
ce on Market Incentives to Provide Diverse 
i  Issues of Public Importance Violates the First Amendment Right to Receive Critical 
93–94). 
 at 834 
tend to dislike programming that is highly controversial o
sponsoring shows that take stands on public issues” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 224. MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 36–37. 
225. See Wilfrid C. Rumble, The FCC’s Relian
V ewpoints on
Information, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 793, 831–32 (19
226. Id.
227. See Rumble, supra note 225,
228. See id.
229. See id. at 832–34.
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any one person or corporation could own.230  The effect of the repeal on ownership 
caps combined with the shift to the market approach eventually trickled down to 
the network news divisions as broadcast stations were bought out and taken over by 
large media and entertainment conglomerates.231  This brought an end to the literal 
and proverbial division of entertainment programming and network news.  With 
decreasing enforcement of public interest informational and watchdog obligations, 
new conglomerate owners abandoned public trustee obligations and focused instead 
on attracting viewers to increase advertising revenue.232  The resulting pressure on 
broadcast journalists to retain network news’s audience was intensified even more 
by the variety of political news and public affairs programming provided on 
cable.233  Network news was recast and commoditized, as entertainment 
programming had been for years.234  Broadcast journalists were also set up as 
celebriti s e and network news and political discourse were relegated to spectacle 
and entertainment in an effort to appeal to the viewer as consumer rather than as 
citizen.235
Despite the corporate squeeze behind the scenes, broadcast journalists continued 
to publicly swear allegiance to an ethical code of objectivity and impartiality.236  In 
practice, these concepts were eventually reduced to a meaning that did not resemble 
the watchdog functionality of the prior decades.  Instead of shedding the light of 
publicity on abuses of power and critically holding those in power accountable, 
network news’s ethical standards of objectivity and impartiality were reframed as 
fair and balanced and essentially recast as uncritical and neutral.237  Moreover, 
political news lost its substance and critique and was soon replaced with political 
sound bites and distracting broadcast journalist chatter and subjective 
commentary.238  Straight jacketed by commercial pressures, broadcast journalism 
developed into “gotcha journalism” aimed at critiquing politicians’ performance 
and outing any inconsistencies rather than at interrogating politicians on the 
substance of their positions.239  Some scholars have argued that with commercial 
pressures looming more prominently than in the earlier era of network journalism, 




b ame characters in their own stories, their identities celebrated.”). 
e cooptation of network news by rapid fire imagery and 
form it into an instrument of public opinion management rather an institution of 
and Sacrificed Localism, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 279, 299 (
 231. Rumble, supra note 225, at 844–46. 
 232. BAYM, supra note 1, at 13; see Rumble, supra note 225, at 845–47. 
 233. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at xvii; BAYM, supra note 1, at 79–80. 
 234. BAYM, supra note 1, at 38 (discussing Disney’s purchase of ABC and the resulting reference 
to ABC journalists as “cast members” of Disney’s production); W. LANCE BENNETTE ET AL., WHEN THE 
PRESS FAILS: POLITICAL POWER AND THE NEWS MEDIA FROM IRAQ TO KATRINA 3 (2008) (asserting
that information passed off as political news has become largely governed by “pollsters, image shapers, 
marketers, handlers, and spin doctors,” and now shapes much of the public’s political comm
 235. BAYM, supra note 1, at 55 (“Network journalists had abandoned the role of instit
o server, and instead bec
236. See id. at 73 (discussing journalists’ public statements on professional responsibility). 
237. Id. at 68–69. 
 238. Id. at 55, 171 (discussing th
soundbites to “trans
public information and accountability”). 
239. Id. at 74. 
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t journalists became the targets of masterful media manipulation by 
of “Jerry Springer” that might have contained interviews with political 
broadcast journalists are simply no longer in a position to interrogate or critique 
political figures.240  Indeed, such inquiry was stifled due in part to broadcast 
owners’ increasing relationship with the politically powerful, who for lenient 
coverage and favorable treatment on the air endorsed deregulatory efforts or 
legislation favorable to their industry.241  Indeed, despite efforts to effectuate 
reframed notions of objectivity and impartiality via fair and balanced coverage, 
some broadcas
politicians and, ultimately, became complicit in the manufacturing of political
spectacle.242
2.  Bona Fide News as Spectacle:  “The Howard Stern Show” and Beyond 
Just as broadcast journalists continued to reify a foregone journalism standard 
despite the network news’s and political culture’s transformation into infotainment 
and spectacle, FCC interpretations of the bona fide newscast and news interview 
exemptions, as this Article posits, seemed to follow suit.  For example, “The Sally 
Jessy Raphael Show,” which aired from 1983 to 2002, was granted the bona fide 
news interview exemption in 1991, even with featured shows on “‘Married Men 
Who Act Like They’re Single,’ ‘Cheating Wives’ and ‘Gay Men in Search of Rich 
Lovers.’”243  The FCC granted the bona fide news interview exemption to 
segments of the show on which a candidate might appear and decided, with one 
conclusory sentence, “all topics are selected on the basis of newsworthiness in the 
exercise of the producer’s reasonable good faith judgment, with no intent to further 
any candidacy.”244  Without any discussion of newsworthiness in the context of 
politics or the enlargement of political discourse, the FCC noted that the show’s 
format met the factors of the bona fide news interview requirement that related to 
the show being regularly produced and under the control of the broadcaster.245  It 
noted also that “Ms. Raphael’s 30 years of xp e erience” in journalism “enable[d] her 
to control the program’s format and questioning by the studio audience so as to 
avoid the advancement of any candidate.”246
And in 1994, despite the warning contained in the Political Primer that not all 
talk shows and related content qualified as satisfying the newsworthiness 
requirement, the FCC granted the bona fide news interview exemption to segments 
 240. Rumble, supra note 225, at 844 (discussing consolidation of network ownership).  See 
generally MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 40. 
4 (discussing in detail how the conglomerates that took over the 
 favorable business taxes, interest rates, labor policies, and enforcement and 
c
M, supra note 1, at 171. 
 Goodman, Critic's Notebook; 3 Queens of Talk Who Rule the Day, N.Y. TIMES, July 
9 , 
 241. Rumble, supra note 225, at 84
networks, including network news divisions, “depend[ed] on the government for a broad range of policy 
support, including
nonenfor ement of the antitrust laws”). 
 242. BAY
 243. Walter
2 , 1991 at C11. 
 244. Multimedia Entm’t, Inc. (The Sally Jessy Raphael Show), 6 FCC Rcd. 1798, 1798 (1991). 
245. Id.
246. Id.
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candidates.247  The ruling cited the oft-repeated statement that the host, Jerry 
Springer (like Sally Jessy Raphael), was an experienced broadcast journalist, who 
was able to prevent the advancement of a political candidate by the studio 
audience.248  It again summarily concluded that all topics were selected based upon 
the broadcaster’s good faith judgment as to newsworthiness.249
More telling of the value placed on newsworthiness by the Political Primer, 
however, is the fact that most of these decisions were granted in the context of a 
declaratory ruling and without evidence that a single political candidate had even 
been interviewed on such shows or, at the very least, even appeared on one.250  In 
addition, in 2003, the FCC declared that the radio broadcast of “The Howard Stern 
Show” qualified as a bona fide news interview program exempt from the equal time 
rule.251  The show has since moved to Sirius satellite radio in a purported effort to 
bypass FCC indecency broadcast regulations and fines.252  It continues, however, 
to air programming similar to that once aired on broadcast radio (and that often ran 
afoul of FCC indecency regulations), such as “win a night with a porn star, fathers 
taking off their daughters’ clothes if they get an answer wrong, homeless jeopardy, 
[and] evaluating women to see if they’re good enough for [P]layboy.”253
Moreover, without referencing or discussing any evidence of actual interviews with 
political candidates, the FCC also implicitly absolved itself of future inquiries as to 
whether political news was advanced by the appearance (should there actually be 
one).  Indeed, in the decision, the FCC provided that “we emphasize that licensees 
airing programs that meet the statutory news exemption . . . need not seek formal 
declaration from the Commission that such programs qualify as news exempt 
programming.”254
The FCC went on to grant the bona fide newscast exemption to those segments 
of the shows “Entertainment Tonight” and “Entertainment This Week” on which a 
 247. Multimedia Entm’t, Inc. (The Jerry Springer Show), 9 FCC Rcd. 2811 (1994).  There was no 
cord, however, or in a perusal of episode listings of “Jerry Springer” that it had ever evidence in the re
conducted such interviews with political candidates.  Id.  This fact notwithstanding, the FCC granted the 
h fide news interview exemption.  Id.
, CNN (Oct. 6, 2004, 3:38 PM), 
 (describing the filmed version of Howard 
t r
ward Stern Show, 18 FCC Rcd. at 18604; see also Ricchiuto, supra note 14, at 283.  
Ric
trageous requests will be granted—allowing more and 
ore media outlets to ignore equal time.. 
.




 251. Infinity Broad. Operations Inc. (The Howard Stern Show), 18 FCC Rcd. 18603 (2003). 
 252. Krysten Crawford, Howard Stern Jumps to Satellite
http://money.cnn.com/2004/10/06/news/newsmakers/stern_sirius/. 
 253. HOWARD 101, http://www.sirius.com/howard101 (last visited Aug. 5, 2010);  Show Overview: 
The Howard Stern Show, TV.COM, http://www.tv.com/the-howard-stern-
show/show/2217/summary.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2011)
S ern’s b oadcast radio show) (pdf on file with author). 
254. The Ho
chiuto writes: 
This directive by the FCC seems to be urging broadcasters not to bother with petitioning for an 
exemption, but to rely on their independent judgment as to whether the exception applies to 
them—not merely as to specific broadcasts, but for their programs as a whole.  The signal sent to 
broadcasters . . . is that all but the most ou
m
Id
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candidate appeared; the FCC made clear that it would not delve into defining news 
or valuing one type of news over another, but would defer such determinations 
instead to a broadcaster’s judgment.255  In doing so, it continued to punt to 
broadcaster judgment that aimed to retain viewers as a saleable commodity to 
advertisers rather than to civically engage them with political news or by 
facilitating political discourse.  To the FCC, any news of current events sufficed to 
satisfy the bona fide newscast exemption—based in part on the fact that the format 
of both shows utilized “the same methods and journalistic guidelines typical of 
traditional newscasting.”256  It concluded that absent bad faith, an appearance alone 
“by legally qualified candidates during [these newslike shows] . . . should be 
accorded the bona fide newscast exemption.”257  This decision essentially endorsed 
the notion that political appearances alone on a program similar in format to 
traditional network news are sufficient to meet the exemptions requirement, even 
absent a discursive exchange in some way related to political news or the 
enhancement of political discourse.258  Ironically, the FCC asserted that an 
appearance on such an entertaining show should be as exempt as it would be on a 
traditional televised newscast program, which as a result of recent industry 
developments now also covered religion, business, sports and other entertaining 
content.259  In doing so, the FCC again tapped away at the erroneous presumptions 
underlying the division of network news formats and entertainment programming 
for deliberative purposes and reaffirmed that an entertainment format alone should 
not preclude the granting of these exemptions.260
 Finally, in the midst of the chaos caused by broadcast journalism’s 
conversion to spectacle, politicians capitalized on the confusion and began to 
appear on entertaining shows not only for popular cultural appeal and mass 
exposure, but also for presumptive softball interviews with little depth on political 
news or interrogation into the issues.261  Indeed, beginning in 1992, candidates 
regularly announced their candidacies on several talk shows, and noticeably 
avoided news programming and the “gotcha journalism” into which network 
 255. Paramount Pictures Corp. (Entm’t Tonight), 3 FCC Rcd. 245 (1988). 
t 246. 
ision, Editorial 
ocky Mountain Low, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 163 





260. Id. In contrast however, the implication of the FCC’s decision to grant “The 700 Club” bona 
fide newscast exempt status on the news portions of its show is that a network news format alone, if 
provided in a way similar to and consistent with “journalistic news principles,” is sufficient, irrespective 
of whether the actual information provided is political news.  Id.  Indeed, because “The 700 Club’s” 
newscast segments include anchors and reporter interviews, the show qualifies for the bona fide 
newscast exemption as it “report[s] some news of some area of current events, in a manner similar to 
more traditional newscasts.”  The Christian Broad. Network for Declaratory Ruling, 23 FCC Rcd. 7165, 
7166 (2008) (internal quotations omitted).  See generally Clay Calvert, Toxic Telev
Discretion & the Public Interest:  A R
(discussing the law’s distinguishing protection of violent content in news programming but not 
entertainment programming, even when provided to retain viewers for rating purposes). 
 26
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journalism had developed.262  However, Arnold Schwarzenegger’s announcement 
of his candidacy for a second term as governor of California on his friend Jay 
Leno’s “The Tonight Show” garnered much controversy and resulted in a 
complaint being filed with the FCC by one of the many other gubernatorial 
candidates demanding equal airtime on the show.263
The FCC aptly rejected the distinctions the complainant made between the 
show’s entertainment format and network news formats, and between Jay Leno as a 
comedian and the journalists-come-talk-show-impresarios who hosted other 
entertainment type shows previously granted the bona fide news interview 
exemption.264  In addition, the FCC downplayed the newsworthiness issue by 
reframing it as related solely to whether Schwarzenegger’s invitation to appear on 
the show was evidence of political partisanship, given his close relationship with 
Leno and Leno’s public support of Schwarzenegger during his first term as 
governor.265  In dismissing the claim of political partisanship as speculative (it was 
grounded only on evidence that the two were  friends), the FCC summarily 
concluded that the appearance was scheduled pursuant to the broadcaster’s good 
faith broadcast judgment as to newsworthiness.266  The FCC noted favorably that 
Schwarzenegger discussed his views on “immigration reform, bipartisan legislative 
activities in California, and the war in Iraq.”267
Problematically, it went on to state, in the same paragraph that summarily settled 
on the broadcaster’s good faith judgment, that Schwarzenegger’s national celebrity 
status as a movie star was of interest to the program’s national audience and was, 
therefore, evidence of nonpartisanship and of the newsworthiness of his 
appearance.268  The implication then is that political news, and not just the format 
in which it is provided, can be reduced to a commoditized product and, as a result, 
can be stripped and diluted of the critical information necessary for self-
 262. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at xiii.  Indeed, both John Kerry and George W. Bush solicited 
a igns.  JONES, supra note 31, at 
7
Tonight Show with Jay Leno, 21 FCC Rcd. 11919 (2006). 
id. at 11924. 
nd advanced via a deliberative infrastructure that promotes its critical and substantive, rather 
votes by ppearing on the “Dr. Phil” show during their presidential campa
1 8.





268. Id.  In addition, in citing its “Entertainment Tonight” decision, the FCC distinguished Jay 
Leno’s satirical monologue at the beginning of the show as pure entertainment and therefore not 
sufficient to satisfy the bona fide news exemption, and also determined that “brief skits,” “live 
performances from entertainment talent,” “music, comedy, or other forms of pure entertainment” are not 
sufficient to meet the congressional intent for the bona fide news interview exemption.  Id.  While the 
FCC here distinguishes pure entertainment from entertainment that performs a deliberative function, this 
Article posits that the FCC, however, has not created a similar delineation with regard to the interview 
itself in furthering the provision of political news or the deliberative process or with regard more broadly 
to network news facilitation of the same goals.  Moreover, while this Article does not ultimately advance 
the idea that the FCC should determine what constitutes a substantive discourse of political news, the 
point instead is that political news, irrespective of the format on which it is provided, must be cautiously 
guarded a
than solely commercial development.  See infra Part III (proposing remedies to creating and sustaining it 
as such). 
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ng programming, and ultimately aided in turning its audience away.  
n the current hyper-commercialized and sensationalized media-
ric
governance.  This Article contends that diluting, commoditizing or manipulating 
political news itself for any reason, including for profit, threatens the deliberative 
structure on which the First Amendment stands and directly contravenes the 
purposes underlying the enactment of the equal time rule and its bona fide news 
exemption.269  It also maintains that such manipulation exceeds the broadened 
application of the bona fide newscast and news interview exemptions to 
entertaining formats permitted by Donahue II and the Political Primer.  By 
continuing to summarily defer to a broadcasters’ good faith judgment in these 
decisions, the FCC has presumed that such interviews and appearances—on either
network news or entertainment formats—were conducted with the same 
investigative and interrogatory watchdog tenacity and commitment embraced in the 
earlier public trustee era of broadcast journalism.  As a result, the FCC and the 
current spectacle of network news became complicit in the manipulative political 
media climate in which such calculated interviews and appearances are advanced. 
The development of shows like “Politically Incorrect” and “The Daily Show” 
establishes, however, that the key to reviving a critical and engaging broadcast 
journalism is not necessarily a return to the network era formats, or even to ethics 
of old.270  While embracing public trustee obligations, network era journalism 
norms still perpetuated a narrowed and exclusionary public sphere that insisted, 
among other things, on separating political news and network news programming 
from entertaini
Shows like “The Daily Show” establish, however, that both can coexist without
devaluating each other.  Indeed, at times, both are needed to draw in and connect
with participants i
h environment of the twenty-first century, where grabbing the attention of the 
public is key. 
3.  Politicized Entertainment as Subaltern Public:  “Politically Incorrect” as 
Bona Fide News 
While network news floundered in retaining viewers to sustain advertising 
 269. Author Harry Frankfurt appeared on “The Daily Show” two weeks after Ari Fleisher, former 
Bush Press Secretary, appeared on the show and admitted that the Bush Administration actively 
controlled the information provided to the public.  BAYM, supra note 1, at 117.  Frankfurt discussed his 
book, On Bullshit, and his disdain for the marketing of political speech and spin.  He distinguished 
“bullshit” from lying and argued that the latter was a willful misrepresentation of the truth while the 
former was worse and evidence of a lack of concern for whether the statement was true or false.  Id.  For 
Frankfurt, bullshit was “a more insidious threat to society because it undermines respect for the truth, 
while political spin was nothing more than a form of bullshit where speakers are “engaged in the 
enterprise of manipulating opinion, not in the enterprise of reporting the facts.”  Id. at 118.  To him, 
specific events to explicitly point out repeated patterns of 
ent officials (unless the reporting occurs in 
bullshit was speech lacking in sustenance and nutritive informational value.  See HARRY G. FRANKFURT,
ON BULLSHIT (2005). 
 270. See generally JONES, supra note 31, at 172 (discussing how “The Daily Show’s” Jon Stewart 
regularly made clear that “[j]ournalistic adherence to norms of objectivity generally prevent[ed] many 
reporters and anchors from looking across 
deception or misjudgment by politicians and governm
investigative or opinion-editorial pieces)”). 
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visibility for this new highly popular genre of television.280  The show flung open 
t olitical talk, challenging normative conceptions of acceptable 
revenues, cable—cushioned by subscription fees—took greater creative risks in 
attracting viewers.271  Building on the same popular participatory sentiments 
targeted earlier by the producers of daytime talk shows, cable introduced 
“Politically Incorrect” in 1993 on the Comedy Central channel.272  With comedian 
Bill Maher as host, the show bridged the gap between purely entertaining late night 
fare and political pundit talk shows and ushered in a new era of politicized 
entertainment on television.273  Bill Ma
luding at least one celebrity, often discussed political and social issues of th
y like the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal. 274  In doing so, like “Donahue” decade
lier, it more closely resembled the language and public opinion of everyday 
izens than those of the experts on mainstream network news or cable pundit ta
ws.275  Indeed, such discussions were: 
in a language resembling more of what would be found in a bar, basement, or 
barbershop than what occurs at the National Press Club or on Meet the Press—a 
common vernacular that is accessible and familiar [with] commonsensical notions to 
what politics means than the conventional elite discourse on television that is largely 
derived from insider knowledge and concerned with political maneuvering.276
Through common sense and humor, which was “lacking on most political talk 
shows . . . [and which] . . . became an important tool of political critique,” 
“Politically Incorrect” mixed entertainment and popular culture with politics and 
the rational realm.277  In doing so, it encouraged the viewing audience to look 
beyond the arbitrary boundaries traditionally drawn between the two.278
Moreover, in satirizing the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal, “Politically Incorrect” 
pointed out that politics, like anything else, was a performance filled with drama 
and spectacle, and made clear that politics was not just a “special preserve for those 
who traffic in insider knowledge and employ a specialized language.”279  When it 
moved from cable to ABC’s network in 1997 to attract the advertiser desired age 
eighteen to forty-nine demographic in the late night market, the show gained wider 
“ he doors of p
 271. JONES, supra note 31, at 65. 
272. Id.
273. Id. at 64. 
274. Id. at 67.  Celebrities represented to the viewing public outsiders to the political machine and 
bureaucracy, who, like the viewing public, most likely did not follow news as closely as the insiders and 
ingly, the show’s top viewers requested, and received in the show’s run from 1999–
alled a “Citizen Panelist,” as a nonexpert guest.  Id.
c
e  and elite discourses.”  Id. at 68. 
Id. at 67. 
pundits.  Id.  Interest
2000, a regular citizen, c
275. Id.  The show represented “a hybrid blend of politics and social issues, humor and serious 
discourse, comedic monologues and group discussions, celebrities and less well-known publi
p rsonalities, and lay
276. Id. at 66. 
277. Id. at 66–67. 
278. Id.  Common sense has been defined as “a means through which publics think through and 
discuss deeper ‘ideological dilemmas’ that often lie at the heart of public issues and events.”  Id. at 66. 
279. Id. at 70. 
280.
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political discourse, including who exactly was allowed to talk about politics,” and 
insisted that “any citizen had the right to talk about political life, even if for 
entertainment purposes.”281  In 1999, the FCC affirmed once again that an 
entertainment format alone was not prohibitive to the bona fide news exemption, 
when it granted the exemption to the entire show and not just segments of the show 
on which a candidate appeared.282  In citing Hustler v. Falwell, where the Supreme 
Court found political cartoons and satire relevant to political discourse, the FCC 
also made clear that “the presence of satire as an element . . . should not prevent the 
program from being considered bona fide in terms of g odo  faith news 
judgment.”283  It also determined that “satire in the form of a broadcast monologue 
about news of the day or during discussion of such issues does not appear less 
important in the realm of political debate than political cartoons.”284
Despite the favorable FCC ruling, “Politically Incorrect” was cancelled—largely 
due to the withdrawal of major advertising sponsorship in response to boycott 
threats by members of the public who were offended by Maher’s statements about 
the September 11, 2001 bombings.285  Maher returned to television in 2003 on the 
cable channel HBO on “Real Time with Bill Maher,” which was somewhat 
removed from advertiser and broadcast censorship.286  The new, slightly altered 
show now featured three guests at a table facing Maher alone.287  With his return, 
he was obviously afforded increased respect as an interviewer and political 
commentator; high profile politicians now appeared on the show, arguably due in 
no small part to the popular success of “The Daily Show,” which had surfaced 
281. Id. at 71.  Arguably, this new genre of politicized entertainment seems different from 
“Donahue” and similar day time talk shows of the early 1980s in that political news may have been 
discussed on those programs, but was not discussed necessarily for the purpose of entertaining while 
ent in its 
 (Politically Incorrect), 15 FCC Rcd. 1355, 1359 (1999); see also supra Part II.B.2. 
tically Incorrect, 15 FCC Rcd. at 1359 (referencing Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54 
n ability in American political culture and sentiment.  Id.  Seventeen networks 
his show along with two major advertisers, namely Sears and Federal Express.  Id.
also informing, as is, or has been, the case and/or effect of “Politically Incorrect” and later, “The Daily 
Show.” 
 282. In the FCC’s “Jay Leno” decision, it did not grant the entire show, as here, the bona fide news 
exemption because Leno’s monologue was deemed as pure entertainment and not directly connected to 
the interview of the political candidate. See The Tonight Show with Jay Leno, 21 FCC Rcd. 11919 
(2006).  Here, the implication of the “Politically Incorrect” decision is that the FCC found deliberative 
value in this entertainment format as it relates specifically to political discourse, as is evid





285. See Bill Carter, ABC to End ‘Politically Incorrect’, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2002, at C8.   In a 
discussion with conservative panelist guest Dinesh D’Souza where both were critiquing President 
Bush’s labeling of the September 11 bombers as cowards, Maher stated, “We have been the cowards, 
lobbing cruise missiles from 2, 000 miles away.  That’s cowardly.  Staying in the airplane when it hits 
the building, say what you want about it, it’s not cowardly.”  JONES, supra note 31, at 73.  While Maher 
later attempted to explain that he was referring to American military conduct during the Clinton 
administration, Maher was roundly attacked and accused of being unpatriotic during a time of 
u certainty and inst
affiliates dropped 
286. Id. at 84. 
287. Id.
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during Maher’s hiatus.288  “The Daily Show,” with host Jon Stewart, had stepped 
into the politicized entertainment void left by Maher in 1999, and with its “fake” 
news program ironically became the interrogating force attacking what was 
professed as truth by political pundit talk shows and broadcast journalists.289  It 
adopted a fake network news format but used entertaining satirical comedy to 
critique and shed much needed light on the political spectacle created by 
politicians, network news and political pundit talk shows.290
During Stewart’s interviews with notable political guests, he “explore[d] 
background and context of current events, [with] some explain[ing] basic 
institutional processes—the kind of information essential to understanding public 
affairs but usually missing in most forms of [network] news.”291  In addition, he 
also exposed “the lack of honesty in political talk and the proclivity among public 
figures to adhere strictly to the talking points and partisan spin that turn public 
discourse into marketing.”292  Moreover, in between the “masterful information 
management techniques and fear-mongering by the Bush administration and a 
television news media that helped facilitate these deceptions and ruses through its 
weak reporting and tendency toward patriotic spectacle,” “ heT  Daily Show” 
“became the perfect format for questioning the faux ‘reality’ that was increasingly 
being created through the manipulations, distortions, and outright lying of the Bush 
administration and a compliant, sloppy, and sensationalistic news media.”293
Notably, unlike broadcast journalism’s continued claim to being the sole 
288. Id. at 85. 
 289. BAYM, supra note 1, at 7. 
290. Id. at 105.  Moreover, in 2005, Comedy Central introduced another “fake” news show—“The 
Colbert Report,” itself a spin off of “The Daily Show”—that took aim at the right wing political pundit 
talk programs and Fox News and their blatant appeal to feelings over truth and facts (referred to by 
Stephen Colbert, the show’s host, as “truthiness”).  Id. at 80.  While “The Daily Show” satirized the 
news, “The Colbert Report” satirized those who cover the news, how they talk about it, and how it 
should be processed.  JONES, supra note 31, at 185.  Ironically, six months after the show aired, Colbert 
was invited to President Bush’s White House Correspondents’ Association Dinner in which he appeared 
in character and proceeded, unbeknownst to the attendees, to satirically offer a scathing critique of Bush 
and his press corps for providing what amounted to “truthiness” to the public.  See Colbert Roasts Bush,
YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BSE_saVX_2A (last visited Feb. 9, 2011) (although 
Colbert’s “tribute” received little mainstream press coverage, this video posted on the Internet of Colbert 
rrespondents’ Association Dinner on August 26, 2007 spread 
u
 advertising revenue purposes.  See generally David Chang, 
than any other presidency.  See
roasting Bush at the White House Co
q ickly and indicates that it received well over one million viewer hits). 
 291. BAYM, supra note 1, at 116. 
292. Id. at 117.  Interestingly, David Chang has argued that to the extent broadcasters provide 
information only for purposes of attracting viewers as a commodity to advertisers, they should not be 
granted first amendment protections since the First Amendment’s goal in preserving speech rights is to 
advance deliberative discourse by parties engaged in speech for that purpose and not for the purpose of 
marketing infotainment to retain viewers for
Selling the Market-Driven Message:  Commercial Television, Consumer Sovereignty, and the First 
Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 451 (2000). 
 293. JONES, supra note 31, at 75.  Indeed, in his interview with former Bush Press Secretary Ari 
Fleischer, Stewart got Fleisher to unapologetically admit that President Bush and his administration 
controlled and restricted the flow of information to the public more so 
Interview with Ari Fleischer, THE DAILY SHOW WITH JON STEWART (Oct. 14, 2008),
http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/tue-october-14-2008/ari-fleischer.
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erate a laugh, “their deeper thrust 
is su rary 
telev h is 
not only to amuse or give e with and to consider.301
Ind
gatekeeper of the objectively truthful political news, “The Daily Show” was “fake” 
in that it refused to profess to be the authority on what was true.294
To Stewart, his show was in fact about not knowing what the truth was or about 
whether the truth was even discoverable.  It was instead, “as with most social and 
political satire [and] humor . . . a means of reestablishing common sense truths to 
counter the spectacle, ritual, pageantry, artifice, and verbosity that often cloak the 
powerful.”295  His show exposed how “slavish devotion to certain factual reporting 
can create conditions where truth becomes lost in the process.”296  In an interview 
with veteran network journalist Ted Koppel on ABC’s news program “Nightline,” 
Stewart argued that the news media must be committed to processing rather than 
“simply repeating what politicians say and, in effect, becoming willing or unwitting 
conduits for dis(information).”297  More importantly, for Stewart, it must “play a 
role in questioning and poking holes in public rhetoric without insisting that the 
audience adopt its own truths.”298  Stewart’s show, “Politically Incorrect” and its 
reincarnate, “Real Time with Bill Maher,” do just that through the entertaining “use 
of satire, parody, and humor as a means of getting at deeper truths within the news-
politics dialect, including questioning the authority of the agents within that 
dialect.”299  While these shows entertain and gen
bversion, an attack on the conventions and pretentions of contempo
ision news.”300  Moreover, they reveal the duality of entertainment, whic
pleasure, but also to engag
eed, viewers of these shows are both entertained and invited to consider the 
current spectacle of democratic political culture and current news programming, as 
exposed on these shows’ own rights of publicity. 
III.  SUGGESTED REMEDIES TO BROADCAST JOURNALISM’S 
DELIBERATIVE PERIL 
Despite the explosion of the blogosphere and the ease and accessibility of the 
 294. JONES, supra note 31, at 182 (“‘The Daily Show’ is fake only in that it refuses to make claims 
ulged in partisan spin while posing as a viable public affairs 
ra note 31, at 78. 
t 76. 
t can ‘lighten their more 
ract younger audiences.” Id. at 87–90. 
a note 1, at 113. 
to authenticity.  But being fake does not mean that the information it imparts is untrue.”). 
295. Id. at 182–83.  Indeed, in Stewart’s much anticipated appearance on the public affairs 
program, “Crossfire,” Stewart, to the dismay of “Crossfire’s” host who assumed Stewart would engage 
in the light banter and humor typified on his show, instead accused “Crossfire” of being fake with “a 
contrived bit of political theater that ind
program.”  BAYM, supra note 1, at 103. 
 296. JONES, sup
297. Id. a
298. Id.
299. Id. at 86.  In addition, these show are markedly different from a short lived genre of 
commoditized politics produced on cable public affairs and news programs channels, like CNN’s 
“Chocolate News” with comedian D.L. Hughley, which represented the reverse process of the 
“entertainmentization of news channel programming [where] news channels have employed news and 
current events as the content for crafting low-cost entertainment programs tha
serious programming schedule, [and] att
 300. BAYM, supr
301. Id. at 120. 
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news media and politics is not accessible to those segments of the population who 
Internet in distributing information, the popularity of these shows confirms the 
continued mobilizing ability and mass appeal and reach of television in a mediated 
public sphere.  They also establish television’s continued relevance to and potential 
for facilitating a more robust and participatory discourse.  America (especially the 
country’s younger generations) is tuned into these shows, which have widened the 
political discourse through entertaining programming that often includes political 
candidate appearances.302  They have also enhanced critical and substantive public 
knowledge and inquiry.303
Broadcast journalists, in contrast, have exposed the fallacy of their own claims 
to being gatekeepers of the authenticated and objective truth through their very own 
public blunders involving fabricated and unverified news stories.304  The 
informational and participatory value of hybrid political entertainment talk shows 
highlight the need for a wider, more interactive and critical journalism 
infrastructure to advance the principles of the First Amendment as reflected in 
America’s early press and deliberative history. 
 While there is much still to be learned from such shows regarding the 
deliberative value of television and entertainment, two or three shows alone are 
simply insufficient to sustain the requisite watchdog and critical journalism 
infrastructure that is necessary for a self-governed society.305  “The Daily Show” 
and “Real Time” take much of their lead from the network news’s and political 
pundit talk shows’ stories of the day, aptly exposing inaccuracies, folly and 
manipulation as mainstream investigative reporting begins to face challenges.306
However, they rare y l uncover new political news—often unearthed by costly and 
timely investigative journalism—or discuss local political news or information not 
brought to national attention.307  In addition, their searing satirical critique of the 
may either be unwilling or unable to pay the monthly premium for cable or Internet 
in order to view them.308  More importantly, they too are subject to the whims of 
302. Id. at 111, 113. 
303. Id. at 6.  Indeed, recent studies have revealed that while most Americans are now news gazers 
who acquire political news and information from a motley of sources, the public reportedly received 
more political news and information from “The Daily Show” than any other network news 
programming, political pundit talk shows or other public affairs programming.  Id.  Moreover, another 
study suggested that among some groups Jon Stewart was deemed one of the most reliable journalists on 
7/a vision/17k
e New Republic and poor fact checking on President Bush’s Air National 
 negatively effecting public trust in professional journalists). 





. See supra Part II.C. 
eed, 
television, standing alongside many veteran network journalists.  Michiko Kakutani, Is Jon Stewart the 
Most Trusted Man in America?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/1 rts/tele aku.html?pagewanted=all. 
 304. JONES, supra note 31, at 181 (discussing story fabrication by Jason Blair at the New York 
Times and Stephen Glass at th
Guard records by Dan Rather as
 305. Scholars have noted, documented and lam
at is] . . . producing a dangerous spiral of frustration and disenchantment.”  LANE & ORESKES, sup
te 47, at 203–04. 
306. See generally MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 96–99; see also LANE & ORESKES
ra note 47, at 203–04. 
307
 308. Sunstein, supra note 41, at 528.  Ind
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the market and the targeted demographic, as the cancellation of “Politically 
Incorrect” reveals.309
Many scholars have convincingly argued that political news is a public good that 
should not be subject to the variability of the market, given its necessity for 
sustaining a self-governing democracy.310  Supporters also point out that market 
externalities and inefficiencies will always lead to insufficient or narrowed 
coverage and provision of political news because of, among other things, the 
unequal weight given to the preferences of the desired viewing demographic, which 
often turns primarily on race, gender and socioeconomic status.311  Congressional 
attempts to amplify broadcast television’s deliberative capacity by imposing public 
interest obligations on broadcasters in exchange for their free use of the spectrum 
have been quite challenging and, at times, an administrative nightmare to 
enforce.312  For example, the equal access rule requires broadcasters to provide 
airtime to qualifying candidates at rates discounted from those charged to 
advertisers, a requirement that broadcasters might arguably ev ead  or minimally 
meet, if at all, since to do so undercuts profit maximization.313  In addition, the 
bona fide news exemptions, particularly the bona fide newscast and news interview 
exemptions, often require the FCC to review and decide individual complaints and 
declaratory requests to ascertain whether the exemptions are met.314
Current FCC interpretation of the bona fide news exemptions has failed the 
broader congressional goal of enhancing broadcast television’s deliberative role in 
facilitating public discourse through political candidate appearances.  This Article 
contends that it erroneously continues to defer to the broadcast judgment that now 
provides uncritical political spin as news, usually clothed either in the guise of 
traditional news programming or as a candidate appearance on an entertainment 
show.315  Such content panders to advertisers and no longer seeks to serve the 
traditional informational and watchdog goals of broadcast journalism; financial 
pressures may, in fact, render it entirely unable to serve these goals.  Proposals to 
broadcasters will continue to be seen by a disproportionate number of people . . . [who] . . . will 
continue to have access only to broadcasters; this significant subgroup is important partly 
because of its sheer size and partly because it includes an especially high percentage of people, 
including children, who are poor and poorly educated. 
Id.
. See, e.g., MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 102; see also Sunstein, supra note 41, at 
igital Broadcasting, in DIGITAL BROADCASTING AND THE 
tal Broadcast Era, in DIGITAL BROADCASTING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 145, at 232–
4
s and Content Policy, in DIGITAL BROADCASTING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 145, at 
26, at 1078–80. 
309. See Carter, supra note 285, at C8. 
310
517.
 311. MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 103–04; Angela Campbell, Toward a New 
Approach to Public Interest Regulation of D
PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 145, at 15–18. 
 312. Henry Geller, Implementation of “Pay” Models and the Existing Public Trustee Model in the 
Digi
3 .
 313. Steven S. Wildman & D. Karen Frazer, A Structure and Efficiency Approach to Reforming 
Acces
213.
314. See Janow, supra note
315. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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needed to foster television’s deliberative capacity, especially as it relates to 
remedy this lack in broadcast journalism presume that broadcasters should continue 
to be subject to public interest obligations that grew out of the scarcity doctrine set 
forth in the Red Lion decision—a doctrine that has consistently been under wide- 
ranging attack since its inception and especially since the development of other 
media and communications outlets.316
The primary premises underlying the development of the scarcity doctrine 
remain true in that the broadcast airwaves themselves are still scarce, that the 
demand for broadcast licenses continues to far surpass supply and that broadcast 
licenses remain in the hands of a consolidated and monopolizing few.317  Indeed, 
even today with the explosion in media options ranging from cable and satellite to 
the Internet and portable MP3 players, a handful of corporations control a majority 
of the nation’s air waves.318  Moreover, Red Lion is still good law, such 
technological developments notwithstanding.319  In addition, even in the face of 
decades of attacks on the scarcity doctrine, Congress affirmed broadcasters’ public 
interest obligations in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, where it also granted 
existing broadcasters free licensure of the newly developed and highly valuable 
digital spectrum.320  In addition, three years after the passage of the 
Telecommunications Act, President Clinton commissioned an Advisory Committee 
study, referred to often as the Gore Commission, to ascertain what broadcast public 
interest obligations should be (not whether they should continue) in light of the 
pending digital transition.321  Any proposed remedies to revive and enhance 
television’s deliberative capacity must, however, take into consideration what 
broadcasters will and can do.  FCC regulatory approaches thus far have expected 
broadcasters, as corporate entities, to operate in such a way that in essence conflicts 
with their profit making bottom line.322  Moreover, any calls for increased 
regulatory obligations (as advanced in some respects by the Advisory Committee) 
must also consider that the FCC is already overwhelmed with keeping pace 
administratively with existing regulatory demands. 
Therefore, this Article contends that a revised funding and regulatory scheme is 
316. See Red Lion v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) 
1, at 7. 
sion viewers to purchase a 
i
 new digital technology grants 
lly pursuant to analog transmissions.  Id. at 3–5.
48 (1998). 
317. Id. at 388, 390–91. 
 318. ANDERSON, supra note 
319. See Thomas W. Hazlett, et al., The Overly Active Corpse of Red Lion, 9 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 51, 51–52 (2010). 
 320. Sunstein, supra note 41, at 503 (discussing the free digital licensure to broadcasters as a huge 
giveaway of a “$70 billion national asset” (citing 47 U.S.C. § 336(a) (2006))).  Broadcasters were also 
allowed to hold on to their analog licenses until they decided how to use, and/or had fully developed 
uses for, the digital spectrum.  47 U.S.C. § 336(f)(4).  On June 13, 2009, all analog signals on broadcast 
television transitioned to digital, which required analog broadcast televi
d gital receiver in order to watch broadcast programming on their television sets. DTV Delay Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-4, § 2(a)(1), 123 Stat. 112 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309 (2009)). 
321. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 54, at 1–2. This
broadcasters the opportunity to amplify their channel and programming options far above those 
permitted technologica
 322. Henry Geller, Public Interest Regulation in the Digital TV Era, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 341, 3
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tely endorses the adoption of a quasi-deregulatory approach via a 
slightly odified pay and co pete model at factors in the equal time rule, as it 
relates didate 
324  The pay and compete approach is 
er/or approach that historically and 
cu
atic as it relates specifically to the provision of political news for a 
number of reasons—some of which have already been discussed above.  The 
proposal not only overlooks the historic challenges in enforcing such a regulatory 
scheme, but also overlooks the probable political resistance to a scheme that more 
B
broadcasters’ provision of political news, substantive interviews and exchanges 
with those seeking political office. Concurrent with the study undertaken by the 
Advisory Committee, scholars of the Aspen Institute Communications and Society 
published a report that analyzed not only:  1) the enhanced public trustee model, 
subsequently endorsed by the Gore Commission, but also four other models, 
namely 2) the spectrum fee model, 3) the pay and access model, 4) the pay or play 
model and 5) the pay and compete model.323  Although arguments supporting 
continued regulation of broadcast television are perfectly sound and plausible given 
the continued scarcity of the medium and the importance of political news, this 
Article ultima
 m m  th
specifically to enhancing the provision of political news via can
appearances on television programming.
ultimately a superior scheme to the eith
rrently underlies most broadcast public interest regulation and policy.  Moreover, 
it is also superior to the other proposed models because it addresses their gaps and 
deficiencies. 
A. EXPLORING AND CRITIQUING OTHER PROPOSED APPROACHES
1.  Enhancing Public Interest Obligations 
While the proposal for increased public trustee obligations would be the easiest 
to implement because such a structure is theoretically already in place, the proposal 
is problem
than likely will heighten FCC powers to regulate content.  Moreover, it sidesteps 
the need for increased public broadcasting funding (“PBS”) while the other pay-
based models address this need directly by diverting fees in some fashion to 
P S.325
323. See generally THE ASPEN INST., DIGITAL BROADCASTING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra
note 145. 
324. See generally Wildman & Frazer, supra note 313, at 193; see also Folami, supra note 127, at 
187 (discussing regulatory remedies to open up access to the nation’s broadcast radio airwaves for 
subverted discourse found in the music of the marginalized within the context of conglomerated 
ownership). 
325. See generally Wildman & Frazer, supra note 313; see also Campbell, supra note 311, at 24.  
When compared with other industrialized nations, the American contribution to public broadcasting is 
significantly lower.  For example, the American government spends only about $1 per capita on public 
broadcasting, exponentially less than other nations, such as Britain, which currently spends $38 per 
capita on public broadcasting.  DANIEL C. HALLIN & PAOLO MANCINI, COMPARING MEDIA SYSTEMS
229–30 (2004); see also Enrique Armijo, Media Ownership Regulation:  A Comparative Perspective, 37 
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 421 (2009) (comparing public interest broadcast ownership by nation).  Indeed, 
less than fifty percent of the current funding for PBS actually comes from government sources.  HALLIN
& MANCINI, supra, at 229–30.  Instead, current public broadcasting is heavily subsidized by charitable 
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2.  Spectrum Fee as Waiver of Public Interest Obligations 
With regard to the second approach—the spectrum fee, which serves as the basis 
of the other pay models—its proponent, former FCC General Counsel Henry 
Geller, contends that broadcasters “should be relieved of public interest 
programming responsibilities and [should] instead pay public broadcasters to serve 
these non-market public interest goals with high-quality programming.”326  Given 
their continued free use of the spectrum and the general failure of the public trustee 
approach thus far, he proposes that they should pay a minimal fee of three percent 
of broadcasters’ gross advertising revenues.327  The government would then funnel 
this money to the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (“CPB”) or a similar 
entity.328  That entity would in turn then have the financial ability to produce 
higher quality public programming.329  Under this model, broadcasters would still 
be beholden to certain minimal standards, including payola and indecency 
restrictions, closed captioning and sponsor identification.330  Critics have asserted 
that the major problem with the spectrum fee model is that it promotes a monopoly 
by putting most, if not all, of the production of such programming in the hands of 
the PBS network, which could lead to the inefficient use of its resources due to lack 
of competition.331  It could also lead to increased attacks of cultural elitism or 
leftist bias, which could in turn pose a threat to continued government 
subsidization.332  Furthermore, by relegating political news and public affairs 
contributions from both individuals and corporations.  Id.  Therefore, merely enhancing the current 
public trustee model may obligate the government to bear some of the cost (through general or specific 
taxes), although under nearly all of the models, it appears the candidate, e.g., politicians, will retain at 
least partial responsibility for the cost of their own messages.  This portion of the cost allocation has 
historically touched upon issues of campaign finance reform, and some, including the Advisory 
Committee, have advocated doing away with LUR fees entirely, and instead requiring broadcasters to 
 Westen, A Proposal:  Media Access for All Candidates 
form of fee collection as more palatable to 
he public interest standard and would be responsible for collecting fees and buying and 
 fees.  Campbell, supra note 311, at 28.  This idea for a new 
odel. See infra
ly on PBS producing it.  
allocate free airtime for candidates.  See Tracy
and Ballot Measures, in DIGITAL BROADCASTING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 145, at 335, 
342. 
 326. Campbell, supra note 311, at 3, 17. 
327. Id. at 18.  Some scholars have proposed variations on Geller’s original spectrum fee model, 
such as charging the spectrum fee not as a portion of gross revenues, but instead as a transfer tax 
whenever a station changes hands. Id.  Some view this 
broadcasters, as they may now incorporate this tax into their future contracts and negotiations prior to 
any transfer of ownership, rather than being charged a new fee on something, which they may have 
already owned for many years without such fee.  Id. at 28. 
 328. Varona, supra note 143, at 92.  Other proposed modifications to Geller’s original concept 
include having the fees collected and distributed by a new organization, modeled after the National 
Endowment for the Arts or the Ad Council, which would be in place to specifically serve the purpose of 
enforcing t
redistributing public interest programs and
entity to oversee public interest enforcement also resonates in the pay and compete m
Part III.B. 
 329. Varona, supra note 143, at 92. 
 330. Campbell, supra note 311, at 18; see also Geller, supra note 312, at 230–31. 
 331. Wildman & Frazer, supra note 313, at 214. 
 332. Legislators have been among those alleging public broadcasting’s leftist leanings which 
could, as in the past, pose a threat to any sources of government funding to PBS and hence a threat to the 
provision of political news and public interest programming premised sole
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ve the de facto effect of once again 
t, of discouraging 
imiting the political 
dis
wever, the pay plus 
 fee model, 
st programming, because the 
fee
programming to public broadcasting, it could ha
bifurcating political news from other television conten
broadcasters from voluntarily airing such programming and of l
course to those that are self-inclined to follow it on public broadcasting without 
drawing in those that are not so inclined.333
3.  Pay a Fee Plus Broadcast Access to Political Candidates 
The third proposed approach—the pay plus access model—is a “hybrid of the 
spectrum fee and public trustee approaches.”334  It attempts to address one of the 
critiques of the spectrum fee model, namely that it would fail to draw in broader 
participatory audiences.335  By retaining the right to access rule, which requires 
broadcasters to give candidates access to the airwaves for a fee during election 
season,336 the pay plus access model could theoretically achieve that goal.337  More 
specifically, under this model, broadcasters would in a sense be required to allow 
political candidates to bring the message to the people via discounted paid 
advertisement aired during regular broadcast programming.  Ho
access model does not address another major criticism of the spectrum
namely the potential monopolization of public intere
 under this model is still paid to a public broadcast entity that would be 
delegated the sole responsibility for providing such content.338
Varona, supra note 143, at 93–94; see also Robert Corn-Revere, Self-Regulation and the Public Interest,
in DIGITAL BROADCASTING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 145, at 63, 74 (discussing the history 
of the prevailing conservative viewpoint that PBS is “biased toward the left”). 
 333. Campbell, supra note 311, at 29. 
 334. Wildman & Frazer, supra note 313, at 204. 
335. See id. at 205. 
336. Id.  In addition, this model proposes free, rather than discounted, access.  Wildman & Frazer, 
supra note 313, at 204–05.  In doing so, it address the unequal exposure of candidates that results when 
access was based on paying (albeit at a reduced rate) for political airtime to campaign.  Id.  Policy 
analyst, Tracey Westen, has written considerably on the idea of universally accessible media access for 
all candidates/ballot measures to address campaign finance inequities in purchasing airtime.  See
generally Westen, supra note 325.  This model does not, however, address the problems that some have 
highlighted regarding the poor quality and content of such ads that focus on sound bites rather than 
substance, a problem that is beyond the scope of this Article.  In response to this problem, others have 
suggested that candidates be required to personally appear in such ads to discuss their position on the 
issues themselves and to not purchase any additional airtime.  Geller, supra note 312, at 235. 
 337. Campbell, supra note 311, at 30 (“It promotes the ideal of a public square, that is, to have 
some basic level of common knowledge in society.”).  Moreover, to encourage more of a participatory 
discourse, others have extended on the “access” portion of this model by advocating that broadcasters be 
required to promote and advertise public interest programming on their airwaves and to allocate “a 
certain amount of time . . . for leasing by third parties to promote a diversity of viewpoints.”  Id.  
Because, however, the FCC would have to retain a prominent role in enforcing lease access time, it is 
unlikely the FCC could meet this demand, given its past failures at enforcing similar policies currently 
in effect.  See Donna N. Lampert, Cable Television:  Does Leased Access Mean Least Access?, in 
CABLE TELEVISION LEASED ACCESS (The Annenberg Washington Program in Commc’n Policy Studies 
of Northwestern Univ. ed., 1991) (discussing the failure of the current leased access scheme to 
effectively serve the public interest in any meaningful way). 
 338. Campbell, supra note 311, at 30 
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ob
es or public interest programming, such content could eventually 
appear solely on those stations, thereby potentially reaching again only a small 
portion uality 
publ
4.  Pay a Fee or Fulfill Public Interest Obligations 
The fourth approach—the pay or play model—potentially avoids such 
centralization, however, by introducing some flexibility into the spectrum fee/pay 
plus access models.  Specifically, it provides broadcasters the option of retaining 
some of their traditional deliberative role by fulfilling predetermined public inte
ligations themselves, or of waving such obligation and paying another entity, like 
public broadcasting, for doing so.339  There are two different versions of the pay or 
play model:  the “spectrum check-off” variant and the “tradable obligations” 
version.340  Moreover, market oriented proponents and critics of the enhanced 
public trustee or spectrum fee approaches would more than likely appreciate a 
corporations’ ability, under this model, to bargain for the most efficient end.341
While the pay or play approach seems to promote efficiency because a 
broadcaster in the best position to meet certain public interest obligations would 
end up doing so under the tradable obligations approach, the net result could again 
be a provision of critical information through one or very few sources.342  If 
broadcasters repeatedly traded obligations or paid their way out of their obligations 
under the spectrum check off approach to the few stations most inclined to air 
political messag
 of the viewing public.343  Finally, with little incentive to produce q
ic interest programming, broadcasters may produce inferior content to avoid 
having to pay another; this hazard would introduce the need for strict quality 
control regulations regarding content that might run afoul of first amendment 
protections.344
339. Id.
 340. Wildman & Frazer, supra note 313, at 206.  The tradable obligations variant is based 
primarily on its success in implementing the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.  Campbell, supra note
311, at 31 (“[The Clean Air] Act established a scheme for reducing sulfur dioxide emissions by 
allocating firms a fixed number of ‘emission allowances’ that they could use, bank for future use, buy 
dcasters to negotiate and work together in new and inventive ways.  Campbell, supra note 311, at 
3
pletely in this regard, should broadcasters decide to buy their way out of these 
.
d see’ or ‘distinguish[ing] between good novels and bad ones.’”  
from other companies, or sell to other companies”). 
 341. Campbell, supra note 311, at 32–33.  The government would need to be heavily involved in 
oversight of the trading of obligations.  Wildman & Frazer, supra note 313, at 206.  This model has, 
however, gained supporters because it also has the potential of encouraging public and private 
broa
3 . 
 342. Wildman & Frazer, supra note 313, at 206, 207 (“[T]he obligations check-off model . . . has 
the potential to fail com
obligations entirely.”)
343. Id. at 207. 
 344. Campbell, supra note 311, at 33–34 (discussing some of the first amendment implications of 
enforcement of programming standards upon broadcasters).  Some have convincingly asserted that 
public trustee regulation falls within constitutional bounds as it is currently enforced.  See, e.g., Geller, 
supra note 312, at 237–42.  Other scholars remain concerned that more aggressive public interest 
regulation measures may run afoul of the “First Amendment [which] forbids government from deciding 
what material citizens ‘shall read an
Corn-Revere, supra note 332, at 72. 
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k to the spectrum fee model that required a broadcaster to pay a fee 
to 
themselves in competition with other broadcasters attempting also to earn back fees 
paid, as well as with the public broadcaster.  A public broadcaster m itially 
B. ADOPTING A SLIGHTLY MODIFIED PAY TO COMPETE APPROACH
With the pay and compete model endorsed by this Article, many of the positive 
qualities of all of the previous models are retained while the gaps in efficiency and 
effectiveness are filled, all without sacrificing broadcast’s traditional deliberative 
function of sustaining an engaged and informed electorate.345  This model takes the 
“play” option out of the fourth approach—the pay or play model, which allowed a 
broadcaster to fulfill public interest obligations itself in lieu of paying another 
entity to do so.  By removing the play option, this model essentially then converts 
the scheme bac
a public broadcasting entity for its license to continue broadcasting on the 
nation’s airwaves.346  Similarly, under this model, the fee would be paid to a public 
authority that would operate as “a buyer of public interest programming and access 
time, spending from a budget comprised of broadcaster payments plus funds 
available from other sources, such as government funding and private 
donations.”347
In addition, under this model, although the “play” option is removed, it is 
replaced by the “compete” component, which provides the broadcaster the 
opportunity to earn back fees paid by choosing to compete in the creation of high 
quality public interest programming.348  With such market incentive, the pay and 
compete model erases the efficiency concern of the pay or play model where 
broadcasters had no incentive in fulfilling such obligations and could possibly 
relieve themselves of such obligations by buying out of them completely and 
transferring such obligation, for a fee, to a public broadcasting entity.  Under this 
model, the broadcaster is incentivized by the option to earn back fees paid.  An 
additional plus is that it increases healthy competition to produce quality content.  
Under this model, if broadcasters choose to compete to earn back fees they find 
ight in
 345. Geller, supra note 312, at 242–43 (maintaining that the greatest public interest need is 
dcasting.  See MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra
vice’s involvement in operating a citizen media 
twofold: “broadcasting and education, and broadcasting and the political arena”); see also Westen, 
supra note 325, at 350. 
 346. Wildman & Frazer, supra note 313, at 218. 
347. Id. at 218–19 (“[A] public interest authority [will be] commissioned to develop and oversee 
public interest programming.  This is pay-plus-compete for a public buyer.”).  While the exact nature of 
such public authority needs a bit more analytical development, some have postulated that it could be “a 
specially designated nonprofit entity as well as a government agency.” Id. at 225 n.14.  Another 
suggestion is that it could be made up of smaller authorities all drawing from the same budget and 
operating as branches of the larger public system with each unit designated its own area of public 
interest broadcasting specialty. Id.  This Article suggests that it could also promote other traditional 
FCC public trustee policy goals like local, diverse and children’s educational programming.  Others 
envision a newly retooled (though perhaps entirely independent) Corporation for Public Broadcasting.  
Id. at 218–19, 225 n.14.  Still others suggest the inclusion of an IRS accounting and oversight facet to 
any new organization tasked with evaluating public broa
note 15, at 202 (discussing the Internal Revenue Ser
voucher program where the public receives government funds to donate to their desired public affairs 
program, which thereby necessitates IRS involvement). 
 348. Wildman & Frazer, supra note 313, at 219. 
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fully subsidized by the public authority in return for a political candidates’ promise 
have the upper hand since it has traditionally produced such programming and 
might, as a result, be in a better position initially to receive the much needed 
funds.349  The authority could commission the broadcaster (public or commercial) 
deemed most suitable to produce such programmi g or cn ould compensate a 
broadcaster to the extent it created such programming.  Moreover, the pay and 
compete model most effectively strikes the careful balance between a corporation’s 
profit driven interests and the need to inform and engage the public through 
verifiable, critical and engaging broadcast journalism.350
Finally, with such built in incentives and criteria for earning back paid fees, 
there would be no need then to retain the bona fide news exemptions; broadcasters 
would be more inclined to provide political news with the prospect of being paid 
back for doing so.  Any program, whether presented in a traditional news 
programming or public affairs format or in an entertaining one, can qualify the 
broadcaster to earn back their fees.  Such program must, however, provide political 
news which meets the basic criteria ultimately established by the public authority, 
and must receive a designated amount of broad-based viewership support as 
established by ratings data or by public charitable donations.351  As it relates 
specifically to the provision of political news, the public authority could use 
various criteria (such as audience viewership, verifiability of information and 
diversity in viewpoints and opinions) on which to judge potential public interest 
programming provided on varied and creative formats that not only inform, but also 
engage and widen the public sphere.352
As a precautionary note, however, it is suggested that the right to access and 
equal time requirements be retained to ensure that politicians are guaranteed access 
to the airwaves and are granted access to it equally.  Such access fees should be 
not to purchase any additional airtime.353  Additionally, the broadcaster should be 
349. Id.; see also MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 104 (discussing the successes 
CCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 201–02 (considering the concept of the 
zoka, The Wrong Way to Reinvent Media, Part 3:  
o
ampaign finance reform efforts.  See Wildman & Frazer, supra note 313, at 219–20.  This model 
 of the previously mentioned models, “requir[ing] the public 
attached to engaging and sustaining the political discourse when there is a viable public broadcasting 
system aptly poised to compete with commercial broadcasters). 
 350. Wildman & Frazer, supra note 313, at 219 (“The primary advantage of the pay-plus-compete 
for a public buyer model is that it turns public service obligations into opportunities for profit that would 
enlist the natural incentives of competitive markets on behalf of the goals served by public interest 
broadcasting.”). 
 351. M
“Citizenship News Voucher” where the government would issue $200 vouchers to the public who in 
turn donates it to their public interest programming of choice or the public authority in support of such 
programming).  But see Adam Thierer & Berin S
Media V uchers, PROGRESS ON POINT 17.4, Apr. 2010, at 5 (illustrating the opposition to McChesney 
and Nichols’s plan, and denying that informative media should be recognized as a public good akin to 
education). 
 352. MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 191; see FULLER, supra note 17, at 210 
(discussing a potential industry created self regulating criteria for developing and sustaining political 
news); Wildman & Frazer, supra note 313, at 219. 
 353. The pay and compete model allows for a better common ground between broadcaster’s profits 
and the need for sufficient political campaign time, without reverting to LUR or forcing candidates to 
skirt c
creates a transparency that is lacking in any
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programming.  Instead, the pu be commissioning programs 
from broadcasters, who choose t on their own accord.357
required to disclose any such candidate’s use to all of the other qualifying 
candidates.354  This model builds successfully upon the foundations of the previous 
models and the traditional public trustee approach to television’s public interest 
obligations.  It allows corporations to operate with their own bottom lines in mind 
while also creating incentives for television broadcasters to both retain and engage 
viewers and to create high quality public interest programming without being 
offered the option of buying out of such obligations upfront, as with the pay for 
play model.355  Paying a fee upfront should spark sufficient creativity from 
enterprising broadcasters interested in earning back their fees and perhaps earning 
even more profit in the process.356  Moreover, the pay and compete model should 
not raise any first amendment concerns, given that the government is not 
determining what commercial broadcasters can air appropriately as public inte
blic authority would 
 to participate or opt ou
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The slightly modified pay and compete model, which retains the right to access 
and equal time requirements, is consistent with first amendment ideals.  As 
discussed herein, the First Amendment, specifically via the early Republic’s 
interpretations and implementations of the freedom of the press and speech clauses, 
enshrines the protection not only of communication itself but also of the 
deliberating and participatory infrastructure that makes such communication 
possible.  This Article joins with those who view political news as a public good 
and also ultimately joins in the call for a revived investigative journalism, which is 
now in peril due to the spectacle that predominates network news and to the 
growing loss in viewers.358  It stops short of endorsing a call for a renewed 
allegiance to a foregone journalistic standard that insists on separating political 
news or traditional news programming from entertaining formats.  The point 
instead is that the format alone is, and should not be, dispositive in determining the 
deliberative value of information provided on such format, lest times revert back to 
a top down “Uncle Walter” determination of what the news is or what it should 
look like.359  The answer also does not lie in gutting the very vitality and substance 
authority to pay market-negotiated prices for access.”  Id. at 219.  Under the pay and compete model, the 
public authority may actually be in the unique position of being able to subsidize (at least partially) the 
ad time needed for candidates, thus allowing the broadcaster to receive the full market value of the 
airtime, while still allowing the candidate the opportunity to air their message potentially for free.  Id. at 
pra note 41, at 531. 
g the difference between “affirmative” and 
220. 
 354. Sunstein, su
 355. Wildman & Frazer, supra note 313, at 218–19.
356. Id. at 223. 
357. See Westen, supra note 145, at 59 n.1 (discussin
“negative” broadcast regulation as it relates to first amendment permissibility). 
 358. MCCHESNEY & NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 102. 
 359. Michael Ventre, Cronkite Was America’s Favorite Uncle, MSNBC (July 17, 2009), 
http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/9600957/ns/today-entertainment/. 
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or by rubber stamping the current commercialization and 
spectacle of network news.360  This Article posits that the law should instead 
proactively facilitate the provision of political news, be it in a traditional news 
format and/or an entertaining one, and the development of a media infrastructure 
that best serves the nation’s democratic and participatory goals.  Adopting the pay 
and compete approach to facilitating such deliberative goals on broadcast is a step 
in that direction.361
of political news, 
 360. BAYM, supra note 1, at 176 (“It seems unlikely and undesirable [to] revert to an older posture 
of professionalism, that top-down paradigm of dispassionate informational expertise.”). 
 361. While this Article has focused primarily on broadcast television, the hope is that giving due 
attention to this medium and its deliberative potential will have positive reverberations for a more 
inclusive public sphere and a political news and journalism infrastructure that is inclusive of the Internet, 
cable/satellite and even, optimistically, print. 
